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OF NATIONAL CURRENCIES 
All  statistical data  published in  this Report are  provisional for 1976 and  often for 1975 as  well. 
Throughout this Report data  for the Community as  a whole  refer to the  present nine  member 
countries: statistics for years  prior to 1973 have  been  adjusted to add  data for the three new 
Member Countries to those of the original  "Six". 
For 1972 and 1973 the unit of account equivalent of national currencies has been calculated at ex-
change parities or central exchange rates as appropriate. For currencies which began floating in 
1972,  exchange  parities  declared  to  the  International  Monetary  Fund  were  replaced  as  from 
mid-1972, initially by the middle closing rate on 29 December 1972. For the currencies which be-
gan floating in early 1973, exchange parities were replaced initially by the middle closing rate on 
the  19th  or 20th  March,  as  appropriate.  The  conversion  rates  for currencies with  floating  ex-
change rates were subsequently altered whenever the monthly average of market rates vari~d by 
more  than  5 per cent from  the  conversion  rate  in  use.  In  each  of the  years  1972  and  1973  a 
weighted average of these conversion rates in force during the year was applied to the available 
statistical material. 
Statistics relating to 1974, 1975 and 1976 have been derived from rates of conversion between na-
tional currencies and the new European Unit of Account based on a "basket" of Member States' 
currencies. The composition of this basket is such that, as at 28 June 1974, the sum of the com-
ponent currencies would have  been equal  in  value  to the International Monetary Fund's Special 
Drawing  Right.  For 1974, conversion rates into the new European Unit of Account as at 30  De-
cember 1974 have  been applied. The  conversion rates applicable to statistics for 1975 and  1976 
have  been  based on the average  of quarterly rates, the  latter being those obtaining on the last 
working day of the previous quarter. The  average conversion rates applicable for 1976 between 
the European Unit of Account, its component currencies and the U.S. dollarwere as follows: 
1 unit of account = 
OM  2.86357  £  0.611212  Bfrs  43.8998 
Ffrs  5.29738  £1r  0.610789  ·urs  43.8998 
Lit  906.824  Fl  3.00802  Dkr  6.83439 
us$  1.12633 INTRODUCTION 
The economic recovery which began around the middle of 1975 continued in the Member Coun-
tries  of the  European  Economic  Community during  1976  but  not without signs  of stress  and 
strain. Rates of growth in the various countries were uneven and at times faltering. Despite the in-
crease in output, most economies were running well below capacity and unemployment remained 
obdurately high. Although some progress was made in the struggle against inflation, by the end of 
the year the rise in prices was beginning to quicken again in a few countries. The problems of pro-
moting economic growth and controlling inflation were made more difficult by bouts of weakness 
in foreign exchange markets of several Community currencies, notably the Italian lira, the French 
franc and the pound. Where authorities were obliged to defend the external values of currencies, 
the steps they took in the form of tightening credit and raising interest rates had unhelpful reper-
cussions on economic growth and  the investment climate. 
The promotion of investment by the business sector as well as by public authorities was however 
clearly seen to be an  essential ingredient of plans for economic recovery in the European Com-
munity.  In  addition  to helping towards restoring  economic growth,  increasing  business  invest-
ment offered a means of tackling the serious unemployment problem which existed in most coun-
tries. Nevertheless businesses whose propensity to invest had  suffered from low profit margins 
for a number of years remained to a large extent hesitant to increase their fixed investment while 
surplus productive capacity existed and the outlook remained uncertain. It should not be a matter 
for surprise therefore that gross fixed investment fell in volume in some Member Countries during 
1976 and  in  some others rose less than output. 
The conditions for the financing of investment varied between countries as much as growth rates 
and rates of inflation but there was no correlation apparent between the cost of finance and  in-
vestment performance. Denmark for example achieved a higher rate of growth of fixed investment 
in  1976 than any other country in  the Community and  also experienced a faster rise in  interest 
rates to a level above those prevailing elsewhere in the Community. In the Benelux countries on 
the other hand, interest rates increased by only a little and towards the end of the year were fall-
ing, while fixed investment declined in volume. As a general rule  interest rates tended to rise in 
countries which experienced a weakening of the exchange values of their currencies: this meant 
in particular Italy, the United Kingdom and Ireland but applied also to France, Belgium and, in the 
middle period of the year, to the Netherlands. In Germany on the other hand short and long-term 
interest rates declined for most of the year. Share markets were less affected by the movement of 
exchange rates than by the low level of confidence and uncertainty about the economic outlook. 
Consequently share prices tended downwards, taking 1976 as a whole, on all markets in the Com-
munity, except in  Luxembourg. 
The  volume  of personal saving  continued to rise  during  1976 if less rapidly than  a year earlier. 
Company profits also seem to have  improved a little on  balance, thanks to higher output and a 
slackening in the rise in  costs. Because of the hesitancy of businesses to invest, demand for fi-
nance was relatively modest, though there were additions to working capital as activity picked up 
and in  some countries short-term finance was sought for the purpose of rebuilding stocks. The 
main impression is that finance was readily available (particularly on the international capital mar-
ket where liquidity was very high) for investment purposes and that, where the terms of borrowing 
became more costly, it was because the authorities were reacting to pressures on the exchange 
rate. 2 
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0 CHAPTER  1 
INVESTMENT 
1.1  THE  ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
TO  INVESTMENT 
In  1976,  gross  fixed  investment  increased  in 
volume  in  five  countries,  Denmark,  Germany, 
France, Ireland and Italy. However, owing to the 
declines in  new investment in  these countries 
in the previous two years, it was only in France 
that  the  level  of investment  in  real  terms  in 
1976 exceed that of 1973. In Denmark, the rise 
in  the  volume  of capital  expenditures  in  1976 
was  remarkable,  although  some  retrenchment 
is expected in the current year. The increase in 
fixed investment in Germany on the other hand 
was more solidly based. In Ireland and Italy, the 
modest  rise  in  investment  that  occurred  last 
year did little to erase the very sharp reduction 
experienced in 1975. The volume of new invest-
ment  declined  further  last  year  in  four  coun-
tries,  the  United  Kingdom,  the  Netherlands, 
Belgium  and  Luxembourg.  However,  in  all 
Member Countries there was a rise, sometimes 
quite appreciable, in  investment in value terms 
last year, with price inflation continuing to be a 
problem in  some countries. 
The  growth in volume of fixed investment dur-
ing  1976 followed a decrease of 5 per cent in 
the previous year;  in  value  terms fixed  invest-
ment was 12 per cent higher in  1976. The turn-
around in investment was encouraged by an in-
crease in volume of the Gross Community Pro-
duct of 4.3 per cent last year though the accu-
mulation  of  stocks,  contributing  about 
one-third of the total growth in economic activ-
ity, featured more prominently in the expansion 
than fixed investment. The rebuilding of stocks 
tended  to lose  momentum  by mid-year,  how-
ever,  and  correspondingly less  progress tow-
ards economic recovery was made  in the sec-
ond  half  of  1976.  Successes  were  achieved 
here  and  there  in  controlling  price  inflation, 
leaving more scope for tackling the problem of 
unemployment  which,  however,  continued  to 
worsen. 
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It can  be  seen  from Table  I that there  was  a 
considerable divergence among the Communi-
ty  countries  as  to  the  performance  of fixed 
capital  expenditures.  Some  countries  experi-
enced  a resumption  in  the  growth  of invest-
ment  in  real  terms  last  year;  certain  other 
countries  suffered  a decrease  in  new  invest-
ment volume in  1976, continuing the decline of 
the previous year and sometimes of the previ-
ous two years. 
In Denmark, as in a number of other Communi-
ty  countries last year,  the  economic  recovery 
of late  1975  and  Spring  1976 tended to peter 
away into stagnation by the middle of the year. 
However,  the  benefits  of  earlier,  stimulative 
policies contributed to a rise in  Gross National 
Product  1n  real  terms  of  4.9  per  cent.  The 
strong  growth  of  personal  expenditures  and 
the  rebuilding of stocks were major factors in 
encouraging  an  increase  in  industrial  output 
and  hence  the  incentive  to raise  investment. 
The  volume  of total fixed  capital  expenditures 
rose by 17 per cent in 1976, following a decline 
of about  10  per cent in  1975.  But the  shift in 
emphasis  of  economic  policies  in  the  third 
quarter  clouded  the  business  outlook  once 
more towards the end of the year and the pro-
spects for investment  in  1977  are  not auspi-
cious. 
The  recovery had  been initiated by the expan-
sion  of export  demand  and  the  buoyancy  of 
consumer  spending  induced  largely  by  the 
temporary  reduction  - until  1st March  - of 
the VAT rate from 15 per cent to 9.25 per cent. 
Government fiscal  policies which  were  aimed 
initially at stimulating the economy, particularly 
in the construction industry, gained some suc-
cess but were less successful in  attaining the 
parallel  objective  of  reducing  unemployment. 
However, it became clear that the costs asso-4 
Table  1 - Gross fixed investment in the Community(') (
2
) 
Percentage change from previous year 
In Value  In Volume 
Countries 
1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976 
Germany  +  7.0  +  5.1  - 2.1  - 1.3  +  8.5  +  3.0  +  0.5  - 8.1  - 4.6  +  5.1 
France  +12.7  + 15.1  +18.2  +  6.9  +14.0  +  7.1  +  6.7  +  1.3  - 4.4  +  4.4 
United Kingdom  + 11.2  +21.1  +17.0  +23.2  +12.4  +  2.1  +  4.0  - 2.4  - 1.3  - 4.3 
Italy  +  6.5  +25.9  +33.1  +  4.3  +21.3  +  1.0  +  8.4  +  3.7  -12.7  +  2.3 
Netherlands  +  4.0  + 11.5  +  6.3  +  6.1  +  6.3  - 3.5  +  5.5  - 4.2  - 3.9  - 1.9 
Belgium  +  8.1  +14.2  +24.2  +  7.3  +  4.4  +  3.6  +  7.3  +  7.5  - 3.4  - 1.5 
Denmark  +15.2  +19.6  +  7.3  - 0.7  +24.1  +  8.2  +  6.1  - 8.9  -10.7  +17.2 
Ireland  +15.0  +26.9  +  9.6  +10.6  +23.1  +  2.6  +14.0  -10.3  - 6.6  +  4.4 
Luxembourg  +  7.9  +17.2  +17.3  +  1.6  +  3.3  +  3.1  + 10.1  +  3.6  -10.1  - 4.5 
Total Community  +10.0  +10.9  +  8.6  +  4.8  + 12.1  +  3.3  +  4.4  - 2.6  - 5.1  +  2.7 
(')  The percentages for 1976 are approximations based on orders of magnitude. 
(
2
)  For individual countries, percentages are based on amounts in national currencies. For the Community to-
tal, amounts in national currencies have been converted into units of account at exchange rates prevailing 
in the relevant year. 
See "Principal Sources" 1.a, 2.b, 3.b, 4.b, 5.b, 6.b, 7.c, 8.b, 9.b, 10.a. 
ciated  with  these  policies,  in  terms of a sub-
stantially higher budget deficit, a resurgence of 
price  inflation  and  an  influx of imports,  could 
not  long  be  supported  and  were  causing 
strains both on domestic financial markets and 
externally for the exchange rate. 
For 1976 as a whole the consumer price index 
rose  by  13.1  per cent compared  with  4.3 per 
cent  in  1975,  although  the  underlying  growth 
rate  of  prices,  excluding  VAT  rate  changes, 
was  less  severe  at 9.5  per cent.  Thus,  in  Au-
gust the  emphasis of fiscal  policy was  turned 
towards  curbing  the  growth  of  nominal  in-
comes and to an increase in indirect taxes on a 
number of consumer products. This  step was 
further reinforced  by restrictive prices and  in-
comes measures adopted by Parliament in De-
cember. These  measures were felt necessary 
to  cut  excess  consumer  demand  and  hence 
the accompanying rise in imports of consumer 
goods, which in  1976 as a whole were a major 
factor behind  the  increase  in  the  current  ac-
count deficit of the balance of payments to an 
amount four times as large as in 1975. Probably 
by the  end  of 1976 the  new restrictions were 
beginning to exert a discouraging influence on 
investment plans. 
Economic and  investment growth in  Germany 
in 1976, on the other hand, laid the foundations 
for  a further  advance.  In  spite  of  weakness, 
particularly in  the  summer and  autumn  of last 
year, the upturn in economic activity which be-
gan  in the autumn of 1975 was  sustained dur-
ing  1976.  The  volume  of  the  Gross  National 
Product increased by 5.7 per cent in  1976 fol-
lowing the 2.5 per cent decline in the previous 
year.  Among the  main  sources of this growth 
seem  to  have  been  higher  demand  from  the 
private sector, emanating in particular from the 
revival  of  new  investment  in  machinery  and 
equipment but partly also from a larger volume 
of  consumption.  A  further  contribution  came 
from  stockbuilding  1md  from  a  substantial 
growth  in  orders  from  export  markets.  Nev-
ertheless  the  effect  of  official  measures  to 
stimulate the economy began to wear off in the 
summer months. Unemployment remained  ex-
ceptionally  high  and  seemed  likely  to  be  re-
duced only to a small extent in the near term .. 
An  important  development  in  the  economic 
recovery last year was the improvement in bus-
iness sentiment.  Major factors contributing to 
this  improvement  were  the  rise  in  industrial 
output of 6.7 per cent in 1976, resulting from a general increase in demand. The higher output 
was achieved with, on average, a smaller labour 
force  and  so  productivity  per  man-hour  rose 
sharply by 5.5  per cent.  At the same  time the 
increase in  wages  and  salary  costs of 5.9  per 
cent in 1976 was considerably less than in 1975 
and  led  to a significant improvement  in  com-
pany profits. 
These  factors  were  important  in  enabling  en-
terprises  to  compete  more  effectively  and 
through  such  competition  they  contributed 
towards a reduction  in  the  rate  of price  infla-
tion.  In  this  context  the  appreciation  of the 
Deutschemark against all  other currencies off-
set a substantial part of the rise in the cost of 
imports. The annual rate of increase in the cost 
of living  index which  had  declined  to 3.9  per 
cent  by  December 1976,  was  not surprisingly 
the lowest rate of inflation in the Community. 
The  improvement in  the profits of enterprises 
was  reflected  in  an  expansion of certain cate-
gories of business investment  - more  in  the 
installation  of  machinery  and  equipment,  for 
example, than in new construction. The smaller 
difference  between  the  real  and  nominal  in-
creases  in  investment  (including  residential 
construction  and  public  authorities'  capital 
spending)  compared  with  1975  reflects  the 
lower  rate  of  price  inflation  affecting  capital 
goods; the value  of capital investment in  1976 
was  8.5  per cent higher than  in  the  previous 
year, whereas the volume increase was 5.1  per 
cent. 
Rates of real  growth of output and investment 
in France were similar to those in Germany but 
were not achieved without strain on the prices 
and  balance of payments fronts. The  revival  of 
economic activity which followed the introduc-
tion  of  stimulatory  mf3asures  in  September 
1975  continued  into  1976.  Even  though  the 
pace of the recovery slowed from the spring of 
1976  onwards,  for  the  year  as  a  whole  the 
Gross Domestic Product was 5 per cent higher 
than in  1975. However a lack of balance in this 
growth,  stemming  as  it  did  largely  from  a 
strong expansion  of private  consumption,  led 
to a speeding up of the rise in  prices and to a 
deterioration  in  the  balance  of payments.  The 
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effect of the increase in domestic consumption 
was augmented by a recovery in the volume of 
exports which in 1976 as a whole grew by a lit-
tle more than 9 per cent. The increase in indus-
trial  output,  while  substantial,  covered  only  a 
part  of  the  rise  in  total  demand  and  conse-
quently the volume of imports rose by over 19 
per cent, despite the depreciation of the franc 
against a number of major currencies. The de-
terioration of the external trade deficit in  1976 
was  accentuated  by the  effect of the  serious 
drought during the middle of the year both on 
exports  and  imports  of,  in  particular,  food-
stuffs. Taking into account these various pres-
sures on the economy, an anti-inflationary plan 
bearing  the  name  of  the  prime  minister,  M. 
Barre, who was its author, was introduced dur-
ing the autumn. 
Gross fixed  investment rose  in  volume almost 
in step with the domestic product but this was 
largely because of the  investment projects of 
public enterprises and of the public authorities 
which  were  implemented  as  part  of the  pro-
gramme  to  restimulate  the  economy.  Enter-
prises in the private sector also increased their 
investment,  particularly  in  the  first  half  of the 
year, but the existence of surplus capacity and 
difficulties in obtaining the finance they needed 
tended to cause them to postpone their invest-
ment  plans.  Housing  investment,  which  fell 
sharply in  volume  during  1975,  declined again 
during 1976. 
The increase in the volume of fixed investment 
in Ireland during 1976 was very similar to that in 
France  but  economic  growth  was  somewhat 
lower and the rate of inflation much higher. The 
annual  rate  of economic  growth  in  Ireland  in 
fact  reached  3 per cent  in  1976.  However,  it 
was not until August that the rapid increase in 
manufacturing  production  of  about  11.5  per 
cent last year began to be reflected in a check 
in  the rise  in  the numbers unemployed which, 
at 9.5  per cent of the labour force,  were  pro-
portionally higher than  elsewhere  in  the  Com-
munity; until then the main  effect had  been to 
reduce  short-time working and  to expand  job 
opportunities for a growing  labour force.  The 
principal  growth  elements were  a re-stocking 6 
movement,  an  increase  in  fixed capital  invest-
ment and a rise of 17 per cent in the volume of 
industrial  exports.  The  volume  of gross fixed 
investment rose by 4.4 per cent in  1976 under 
the stimulus of higher business and  public au-
thorities'  capital  expenditures, following  a de-
cline of 6.6  per cent in  1975. 
A  major concern  of the  business  sector and 
the  public authorities was the  threat of a pro-
gressive  loss of competitiveness of Irish  pro-
ducts  through  increased  labour  costs  and 
prices. Indicative of the problem, the consumer 
price  index  rose  by  20.6  per  cent  over  the 
twelve months to November 1976. The need to 
restrain incomes growth received general sup-
port in  negotiations leading towards a renewal 
of the  National  Pay  Agreement.  However,  the 
Associated  Banks'  employees,  not  in  fact 
covered  by  the  Pay  Agreement,  sought 
through industrial action to improve their posi-
tion;  this  action  closed  the  major part  of the 
banking  system  between  late  June  and  early 
September. 
With  agricultural  exports  depressed  last  year 
following  the  sharp  expansion  in  1975,  the 
value  of total  merchandise  exports grew at  a 
slower pace than that of imports - in part due 
to the increase in capital goods imports - and 
led  to  the  worsening  of the  current  account 
deficit of the balance of payments from £ lr.  18 
million in  1975 to £ lr.  150 million last year. The 
depreciation of the Irish pound of 8.7  per cent 
on  a trade-weighted basis in  1976  had  a two-
fold effect; in  external trade it helped to offset 
to some extent the effects of the domestic rate 
of inflation and so to maintain the competitive-
ness of Irish exports but internally it raised the 
prices  on  the  domestic  market  of  imported 
goods. 
The  investment  climate  in  Italy was  also  ad-
versely affected by a high and rising rate of in-
flation and, as in Ireland, most of the volume in-
crease  in  fixed  investment was  attributable to 
the  capital  expenditure  programmes  of  the 
public  authorities.  The  rise  in  the  volume  of 
Gross Domestic Product in Italy last year of 5.6 
per cent was one of the most rapid in the Com-
munity, being in part a rebound from the steep-
ness of the recession in  the previous year.  In-
dustrial output was  12 per cent higher in  1976 
but even this gain was  insufficient to compen-
sate for the decrease in 1975. The rebuilding of 
finished product stocks in the first half of 1976 
contributed  significantly  to  the  economic  re-
covery but tended to fade later in the year. The 
strength  of  consumer  demand  on  the  other 
hand  remained  considerable  throughout  1976 
and led to a rise of some 38 per cent in the val-
ue of merchandise imports. Largely as a result, 
the  current  account  deficit  of the  balance  of 
payments deteriorated from under Lit 400 milli-
ard in 1975 to almost Lit 2 400 milliard last year. 
This  deterioration  was  largely  responsible  for 
the decline in the year to December 1976 of the 
exchange  rate  for the  Lira  averaging  20  per 
cent against the currencies of Italy's main trad-
ing  partners,  weighted  according  to  their  im-
portance.  As a result of the  severe  deprecia-
tion of the Lira and the rundown of foreign cur-
rency  reserves,  the  previously  stimulative 
budgetary  policy,  largely  involving  investment 
incentives,  had  to  be  reversed.  Furthermore, 
one  of the  commitments  entered  into  at  the 
time of the granting by the EEC of a $ 1 milliard 
loan to Italy in  March of last year,  was that the 
public  sector  deficit  would  be  limited  to  Lit 
13 800  milliard  in  1976.  The  tightening  of 
economic  policies,  and  more  particularly  the 
austerity  programme  introduced  in  October 
which  involved  increased  indirect  taxes  and 
higher  public  service  charges,  was  linked  to 
the  need  both  to  contain  the  growth  of the 
public sector deficit, and hence the proportion 
financed  by  an  expansion  of  the  monetary 
base,  and to reduce the growth of imports. 
The  slowing of price inflation to 11.2  per cent 
as  of end-1975 proved short-lived and  the an-
nual  rise  in  the cost of living  had  almost dou-
bled by December 1976 to 21.8 per cent. Major 
factors  behind  this rise  were the depreciation 
of the  Lira  and  the consequent rise  in  import 
prices,  increases  in  indirect taxes and  the  in-
dex-linked  increases  in  wage  rates.  Although 
the  Government  introduced  measures  in  the 
fourth quarter to limit the inflationary impact of 
index-linked  salary  rises  for  higher  income groups,  wage  compensation  per employee  in 
1976  as  a whole  averaged  some  21  per  cent 
more  than  a  year  earlier.  Under  such  condi-
tions of accelerating inflation,  uncertainties as 
to future economic policies and recurring pres-
sure  on  the  exchange  rate,  business  invest-
ment was relatively subdued last year. While to-
tal  investment  in  the  economy rose  by  some 
2.3  per cent in volume terms, the major thrust 
behind capital spending derived from the pub-
lic sector's investment programmes. 
As in Italy exchange rate problems in the  Unit-
ed  Kingdom  imposed  constraints  on  policy 
which rendered the control over the rate of in-
flation and the stimulation of economic activity, 
including investment, more difficult. The rate of 
inflation  in  the  U.K.,  as  indicated  by  the  in-
crease in the retail price index, declined during 
1976  to just over  15  per cent compared  with 
about 25  per cent a year earlier.  Even  so the 
rate  remained higher than those of most other 
trading  partners.  Moreover,  the  initial  slowing 
of inflation in the first seven months of 1976, in 
response to the  Government's wage  restraint 
policy, was  checked and  even  reversed  in  ~he 
latter  part  of  the  year  as  import  prices  ex-
pressed in terms of sterling rose as a result of 
the depreciation of the currency. 
The  ensuing  problems  were  reflected  in  a 
slackening of economic growth after a relative-
ly buoyant first quarter and for 1976 as a whole 
the Gross Domestic Product was  only 1.0 per 
cent  higher  in  volume  than  in  1975.  Personal 
disposable incomes declined in  real  terms for 
the second  successive year and  the  business 
sector's  confidence  remained  low.  The  num-
bers  of unemployed  increased  further  during 
the  course  of the  year  and  averaged  5.4  per 
cent of the labour force compared with 3.9 per 
cent in 1975. The visible trade deficit worsened 
sharply  in  the  second  quarter  and,  together 
with  the  comparatively high  inflation  rate,  had 
an  adverse  effect  upon  the  confidence  of 
non-resident holders of sterling and  contribut-
ed  to  a  sharp  depreciation  in  the  exchange 
value  of the  pound  against  the  currencies  of 
the  United  Kingdom's  main  trading  partners. 
These developments limited the scope for sti-
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mulative  action  and  made  even  more  impera-
tive the continuation of existing anti-inflationary 
policies. 
The  voluntary restraint on  wage  and  salary in-
creases, which was  introduced for one year in 
August 1975 and came to be  known as  "stage 
one" of the current incomes policy, succeeded 
in restraining the increase in hourly earnings in 
manufacturing to some  15  per cent during its 
period  of  operation.  "Stage  two"  of  the  in-
comes  policy  sought  to  consolidate  this  im-
provement  and  reduce  earnings  growth  even 
further, to 8 per cent in the August 1976-July 
1977  period.  Reductions  in  direct  taxes, 
amounting  to some  £  900  million,  which  were 
announced with the April 1976 Budget as con-
ditional  upon  the  general  acceptance  of  the 
new proposals for the restraint of increases in 
incomes, helped the Government in the pursuit 
of its policy.  Both public and  private spending 
on  fixed  investment were  reduced  in  1976  -
the  former  because  of the  need  to  limit  the 
growth in the public sector's financing require-
ment,  and  the  latter  because  of  the  slow 
growth and consequent doubts about the need 
for  further  capacity  and  about  being  able  to 
earn  an  adequate  return.  As  a result,  the  vol-
ume of total fixed capital investment fell by 4.3 
per  cent  during  1976,  the  third  consecutive 
year of decline. 
Fixed investment in the Benelux countries also 
declined  in  1976,  but this  occurred  against  a 
generally stronger economic background than 
in  the  U.K.  Progress  towards  economic  re-
covery  in  the  Netherlands  in  1976  was  slight 
until the last four months of the year, when out-
put took a step upwards as  a result of which 
the volume of Gross National Product rose by 
some  4 per cent.  This  pattern was  evident  in 
the performance of the index of industrial pro-
duction which, after rising sharply towards the 
end of 1975, gained no further ground until the 
last four months of 1976, when it rose suddenly 
and then levelled out again; the resultant annu-
al  average  of the  index was  6 per cent higher 
than  in  the previous year. The  main  sources of 
the revival  in  economic activity were increases 
in  private and public expenditure on consump-8 
tion  and  a  movement  to  rebuild  stocks.  Ex-
ports  grew  rapidly  and  also  contributed  to-
wards the  general recovery.  Fixed  investment, 
however,  remained  depressed  but fell  less  in 
volume than in  1975. 
As in other countries in the European Commu-
nity, the Government was confronted with the 
need  to  reconcile  its  attempts  to  provide  a 
fresh stimulus for the economy with its efforts 
to reduce inflation. The increase in the Govern-
ment's  current  expenditures  occasioned  by 
the introduction of a series of stimulative mea-
sures during the year,  coupled with the larger 
transfer  payments  resulting  partly  from  the 
high level of unemployment, widened the bud-
get deficit. In addition to developing new tech-
niques  for borrowing,  the  Government raised 
the  rate  for VAT  on  1 October by 2 per cent 
though this, however, increased prices further. 
The  increase  in  VAT  had  originally  been 
planned for 1 July but was postponed so as not 
to impair too seriously the Government's main 
strategy  in  tackling  inflation  through  controls 
over prices and  incomes,  rather than  through 
reducing liquidity with a consequent risk of ex-
erting an  undesired upward pressure on  inter-
est rates.  The  limitation  of price increases in-
troduced in earlier years was continued during 
1976,  but with a permitted leeway. Wages and 
salaries were frozen at their real  levels  in  No-
vember 1975 for a period of six months (com-
pensation  for price  increases  being  allowed), 
but  as  from  July  1976  controls  over  pay  in-
creases began to be relaxed so as to allow an 
increase  in  the  real  income  and  purchasing 
power  of  those  earning  lower  incomes.  The 
continuation  of wage  restraint  resulted  in  the 
increase in average wages per employee being 
held to 8 per cent in the twelve months to De-
cember  1976  compared with  a rise  of  12  per 
cent in the previous year. 
The  influences  on  prices  were  rather  more 
complex. The smaller rise in wage costs was a 
significant element in 1976 and to a certain ex-
tent the  appreciation  of the  external  value  of 
the  guilder  (despite  the  depreciation  against 
the Deutschemark within the European curren-
cy snake  in  October 1976)  against  most cur-
rencies helped to lower the cost in guilders of 
imported  goods.  Both  these  developments 
contributed to the effectiveness of the policy of 
price restraint and  as a result prices rose  less 
in  the  Netherlands  in  1976  than  in  all  other 
Member Countries except Germany. The  con-
sumer price index, for example, levelled out af-
ter the increase in VAT in  October and its rise 
in  the  twelve  months to December  1976  was 
thereby curtailed to 8.3 per cent. 
After  experiencing  a  squeeze  on  profits  for 
several  years,  the  profitability  of  enterprises 
improved  a  little  in  1976  but  business  senti-
ment remained dull. Domestically the scope for 
further increases in  profits was  severely limit-
ed.  Externally exports were  more  competitive 
than in the previous year, thanks to the relative 
improvement in  costs of production, but here 
also the scope for increasing prices and  profit 
margins was limited by the rise in the exchange 
value  of the  guilder against the  currencies of 
several  of  the  Netherlands'  trading  partners. 
Because there appeared to be little prospect of 
an  improvement  in  profitability  either  in  the 
domestic market or in  exporting and  because 
of the persistance of a considerable amount of 
unused  productive  capacity,  the  incentive  in 
1976 for enterprises to invest was low. Largely 
as a result of this, gross fixed capital formation 
rose modestly in  value  by 6.3  per cent which, 
translated into terms of volume, represented a 
fall  of 1.9  per cent,  only slightly less of a de-
cline than  in  1975. 
In  Belgium last year the  business outlook im-
proved  a little from  t.ime  to time  as  industrial 
production  rose  to  almost  the  level  attained 
two  years  earlier,  and  profitability  tended  to 
recover. Fixed investment declined but by a lit-
tle less than in the Netherlands. 
The  volume  of  Gross  National  Product  in-
creased by about 3 per cent in  1976, with the 
principal impetus deriving from higher consum-
er spending and a strong growth in  public au-
thority capital  expenditures. An  important fac-
tor in sustaining the rise in manufacturing pro-
duction early  in  the year  was  the  need  to re-
build  stocks  in  anticipation  of a business  re-
covery:  but with the worsening in  the outlook in  the second half of the year the re-stocking 
movement  largely  ceased.  The  growth  in  de-
mand both from manufacturers (for raw materi-
als)  and from consumers led to a faster growth 
of imports in 1976 than exports and hence to a 
deterioration in the visible trade balance which 
in turn had a weakening effect on the currency 
and,  through this, on the capital market. 
Government incomes policy, and  more specif-
ically the April stabilization measures (including 
the temporary suspension of indexation for in-
comes  above  a  certain  level,  the  freezing  of 
rents and professional incomes, and the reduc-
tion of permitted dividend disbursements) con-
tributed to the slowing of the growth in money 
incomes  and  prices.  Average  hourly earnings 
of industrial  and  transport workers  increased 
by only 9.5  per cent during 1976 as compared 
with a rise of 17.4 per cent in the previous year. 
Owing largely to the rise in manufacturing out-
put, productivity per man-hour rose by an  esti-
mated 9 per cent in  the first half of 1976  and 
the increase in  salary costs per unit of output 
fell  sharply  compared  with  the  previous year. 
The  impact of this  improvement is evidenced 
both by the progressive curbing of the rate of 
price inflation (to an annual rate of 7.6 per cent 
at the end of 1976 as against 11  per cent a year 
earlier)  and  a  simultaneous  improvement  in 
company  profits.  However,  this  was  not 
enough to overcome the pessimism regarding 
the  economic outlook which  deepened  in  the 
second half of the year and fixed capital forma-
tion by businesses fell further. Mainly because 
of this  fall,  total  fixed  investment  declined  in 
1976 by about 1 per cent after having been re-
duced by 3 per cent the previous year. 
The decline in the volume of investment in Lux-
embourg of 4.5 per cent in  1976, after a steep-
er decline  in  the  previous year  was  the  most 
serious in the Community. The signs of the be-
ginnings of a recovery in markets for steel pro-
ducts in early 1976 proved short-lived and con-
sequently the growth of the Luxembourg econ-
omy which depends heavily on  steel tended to 
slacken in the second half of the year. The de-
cline  in  output in  the  steel  industry of 1.3 per 
cent last year was offset to some extent by the 
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expansion of production in the chemicals and 
rubber industries and  by a continuation of the 
rapid  growth  of the  services  sector.  The  vol-
ume of Gross Domestic Product increased by 
about 3 per cent in  1976 after having declined 
by  8  per  cent  in  the  previous  year.  This  re-
covery stemmed from the growth in exports of 
goods and services (particularly of invisible re-
ceipts  associated  with  the  financial  sector) 
while domestic demand in  real terms remained 
weak.  Consumer  spending  rose  only  slightly, 
even  after the  stimulus to purchases  of con-
sumer durables occasioned by the  removal  in 
April  of  restrictions  on  hire-purchase  credit, 
and  investment expenditures continued to lag 
behind the economy as a whole. 
Because the Luxembourg economy is so open 
and  susceptible  to  international  influences, 
with most domestic industries producing prin-
cipally  for  export,  Government  policies  have 
been  directed  more  towards  limiting  the  ad-
verse  effects  of  such  influences,  such  as 
compensation  for  partial  employment,  rather 
than  introducing  stimulative  counter-cyclical 
policies which would tend to draw in  imports. 
However,  the  authorities  resorted  to  special 
public works programmes and  to fiscal  incen-
tives for the encouragement of new investment 
by the steel industry. 
The rise in prices tended to be moderated. The 
consumer price index, taken as  a whole,  rose 
by 8.5 per cent in  1976 largely because a rela-
tively small increase in the cost of imported ar-
ticles coupled with a freeze  on  the retail  mar-
gins of selected food items offset an  accelera-
tion in the rate of increase in the prices of oth-
er domestically produced goods. 
1.2  INVESTMENT IN THE COMMUNITY 
COUNTRIES BY SECTOR: CAPITAL 
EXPENDITURES, HOUSING CONSTRUCTION 
AND PUBLIC AUTHORITIES' INVESTMENT 
In  terms of current prices fixed  investment in 
the European Community rose in step with the 
Gross Domestic Product,  rerflaining  at  21  per 
cent of the latter in contrast to the 23 per cent 10 
or so recorded at the beginning of the decade. 
The  sectoral breakdown of gross fixed invest-
ment outlined in Table  2 indicates that the ac-
celeration of investment in  1976 was limited to 
the business and housing sectors. 
Business capital expenditures rose by 12.0 per 
cent  in  1976  compared with a gain  of 6.4  per 
cent in the previous year. Taking the Communi-
ty as  a whole,  it seems probable that fixed in-
vestment  by  businesses  rose  moderately  in 
volume  in  1976. The  reasons for this seem  to 
have been the gradual improvement in the bu-
siness  climate  and  outlook  as  the  various 
economies began to recover from recession. A 
slowing of the rise in costs and higher capacity 
utilization resulted in  many instances in an  en-
couraging  increase  in  profitability. To  this was 
added  an  improvement  in  the  prospects  for 
sales. 
Housing  construction  expanded  even  faster 
than  business  investment,  rising  by  14.1  per 
cent  in  value  in  1976.  In  general  the  housing 
market  in  many  countries  entered  into a ten-
tative recovery phase after the pressures of the 
last few recessionary years in which the extent 
of  unsold  housing  units tended  to inhibit the 
resumption of growth in  new house construc-
tion.  In  a  number  of  countries  a  movement 
away  from  multi-unit  housing  towards  single 
family  dwellings,  probably represented the ef-
fect  of  rent  controls  which  discouraged  the 
construction of housing for rental. 
While  public  authority  capital  expenditures 
grew faster than  other forms of investment in 
1975, this situation was changed in  1976 when 
public authority investment in rising by only 9.1 
per cent was  less buoyant than  that  of other 
sectors.  In  a  number of  countries  the  coun-
ter-cyclical stimulative programmes of Govern-
ments continued to exert an  upward influence 
on  capital expenditures but began to taper off 
during the year. 
Chart II  indicates the extent of changes in indi-
vidual  sectors of investment for the  members 
of the  Community,  while  Table  3 outlines  the 
proportions of each sector of investment in re-
lation  to the  whole.  From  this table,  one  can 
clearly see the effect of the decline in the pub-
lic authorities'  investment  in  the  United  King-
dom  and  Germany  in  1976.  The  counterpart 
was  a rise  of  1  - 2  percentage  points  in  the 
proportion of business investment to total in-
vestment in these two countries. 
The  main weakness of fixed investment during 
1976  in  a  number  of  Member  Countries  ap-
pears to have been hesitancy on the part of the 
business sector to increase productive capaci-
ty. This applies particularly to Belgium, Luxem-
bourg and  the  Netherlands in  which  business 
investment  declined  in  volume.  The  United 
Kingdom  also  experienced  a decrease  in  the 
volume  of  business  investment  though  this 
decrease was smaller than in investment by the 
public authorities. 
Table 2 - Gross fixed investment in the Community: by sector(') 
In milliard units of account  Percentage of 
at current prices  total 
Sectors 
1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1972  1976 
Business investment  97.1  108.5  121.1  128.8  144.2  55.9  55.5 
Housing  49.2  56.5  62.3  64.7  73.8  28.4  28.4 
Investment by public 
authorities  27.2  29.3  34.6  38.5  42.0  15.7  16.1 
Total Community  173.5  194.3  218.0  232.0  260.0  100.0  100.0 
(')  The  statistics for 1976 are estimates of orders of magnitude. 
See  "Principal Sources" 2.b, 3.b, 4.b, 5.b, 6.b, 7.c, 8.b, 9.b,  10.a. In Italy, on the other hand, the growth of invest-
ment by the  public authorities far outweighed 
the  modest  rise  in  business  investment;  this 
pattern occurred in  a less pronounced form in 
Ireland. In France, Germany and Denmark busi-
ness  investment  increased  faster  in  volume 
than the domestic product. 
As mentioned earlier,  business expenditure in 
Belgium on fixed capital investment declined in 
volume  by  11.4  per  cent  in  1976  following  a 
drop of 4.3 per cent in the previous year. While 
the  underlying  business  situation  was 
strengthened last year,  the faltering of the  re-
covery in the second half tended to inhibit the 
expansion of new business investment. 
On  a number of fronts,  however,  the  founda-
tions were being laid for a future increase in in-
vestment activity. The counterpart to the rise in 
manufacturing output was  the  improvement in 
capacity utilization which increased from a low 
point of 71  per cent in  October 1975  to 76.6 
per cent in  May  1976,  when  however it stabi-
lized. In addition, the very small increase in unit 
wage costs of production, in relation to poten-
tial price gains, enabled the average enterprise 
to recoup  some  of the  profitability which  had 
been  severely  eroded  during  the  recession. 
Nevertheless profit margins in certain key sec-
tors of industry such as steel, non-ferrous me-
tal  products,  chemicals,  paper  and  textiles, 
continued  to  be  under pressure owing  to the 
weak order position. 
In contrast, the volume of housing construction 
increased by 5 per cent in  1976 and,  after tak-
ing into account the rise in prices of new hous-
ing, rose by 24  per cent in  value  terms. Major 
factors in this substantial surge in activity were 
the carry-over of unsatisfied demand from the 
previous  year,  the  ready  availability  of  mort-
gage funds at  reasonable rates and,  to a cer-
tain  extent,  the  temporary  raising  (until  early 
1976)  of the amount of grants available  to sti-
mulate  new construction activity in  certain  re-
gions of the country. New building permits in-
creased so rapidly in  the first half of 1976 that 
the  authorities  felt  compelled  to  restrict  the 
availability of new mortgages in  order to avoid 
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excess  pressure on  the construction industry 
and  on financial resources. 
The  volume  of investments  by  the  public  au-
thorities grew in  1976  by almost 5.5  per cent, 
largely  because  the  counter-cyclical  accelera-
tion of Government construction programmes 
which  began  in  1975  remained  in  force  last 
year. 
Luxembourg  while  benefiting  similarly  from 
special public works programmes, also experi-
enced  a fall  in  the  volume of business  invest-
ment  which  declined  by  about  7  per cent  in 
1976.  This  was  the  third  consecutive  year  of 
contraction  but,  on  this  latest  occasion,  the 
weakness  of the  steel  industry's markets was 
not to blame, since steel investment increased 
by an  estimated 44  per cent in  value  last year. 
In view of the importance of the industry to the 
Luxembourg  economy  (contributing  30  per 
cent of total business investment), the Govern-
ment  initiated  fiscal  incentives  in  December 
1975,  which were the key factor in  stimulating 
an  expanded investment programme. New bu-
siness construction by the  rest of the econo-
my,  however,  was  very  much  lower  than  in 
1975;  indicative  of this,  the  usage  of cement 
was  reduced  by some  16  per cent  last  year. 
With a view to encouraging investments in gen-
eral,  the Government has  decided to raise  the 
rate of investment premiums from 9 per cent to 
12 per cent, but this measure will only take ef-
fect in  1977. 
New residential construction also declined, by 
some 13.5 per cent in volume terms, reflecting 
the  lower demand for housing which  has  pre-
vailed  in  recent  years.  As  in  1975,  the  fall  in 
construction was  centred  on  new apartments 
since  demand  for  houses  appears  to  have 
stabilized.  One  effect  of  the  reduced  activity 
has  been to bring the rate  of price inflation in 
the  residential  construction  sector more  into 
line with the rest of the economy than in recent 
years. 
Fixed investment by the public authorities rose 
in  the  neighbourhood of 20  per cent  in  value 
terms last year which  implied an  expansion  in 
volume of about 10 per cent. The special public 12 
works  programme  instituted  by  the  Govern-
ment as an  employment stimulant was a major 
factor which added roughly 13 per cent to the 
value of capital expenditures by public authori-
ties  between  September 1975,  when  the  pro-
grammes started, and March 1977. 
In  spite  of the granting  of substantial  invest-
ment allowances and their increase as from the 
month of June, the volume of business capital 
expenditure  in  the  Netherlands declined  by  a 
further 4.5 per cent in  1976 or to the same ex-
tent as during the previous year but rather less 
than  that in  its Benelux partners. The  lack  of 
growth in new productive investment stemmed 
directly from a relatively high degree of unuti-
lized  capacity  and  uncertainty  as  to  whether 
business  conditions  would  improve.  Under 
such  circumstances  new  investment  tended 
towards  the  installation  of  labour-saving  ma-
chinery and  equipment rather than  extensions 
to capacity through new construction. 
A problem for the residential construction sec-
tor in  recent years has been the saturation of 
the market and the need for the industry to ad-
just its size to the reduced level of household 
formation. There is some evidence that a new 
state of balance had been reached in 1976 fol-
lowing  years  of decline  in  new  construction. 
Although  the  number of dwellings  completed 
was  lower in  1976, that of housing starts was 
moderately higher than  a year  earlier.  Capital 
spending on  new housing increased by about 
11  per cent in value and by about 2 per cent in 
terms of volume. The pattern of demand in the 
Netherlands, as in a number of other countries 
in  the  European  Community,  appears to have 
shifted towards detached dwellings rather than 
apartments. 
The  volume  of public authority investment in-
creased by 3.5 per cent in  1976, roughly as  in 
the previous year. This expansion reflected the 
continuing  emphasis  of the  public  authorities 
on  providing  new  employment  opportunities, 
particularly  in  the  depressed  90nstruction  in-
dustry. 
The  United  Kingdom  authorities  have  also 
sought to expand job opportunities, aiming to 
achieve this by encouraging productive invest-
ment.  The  reduction  of  some  of  the  higher 
rates of VAT  in  the April 1976 Budget was ex-
pected to stimulate consumer expenditure and 
so to create a climate in which domestic output 
might rise,  bringing idle productive capacity in-
to use.  In August, a revision of the Price Code 
to allow applications to raise  prices to take a 
greater part of the cost of investment into ac-
count probably eased  the financial  position of 
companies.  The  significant  increase  in  the 
value of trading profits in 1976 might have been 
less but for these two measures. 
On the other hand, business sentiment was ad-
versely affected to some extent by the raising 
of social security contributions payable by em-
ployers.  Greater  discouragement,  however, 
came  from  the  slow growth of industrial  pro-
duction which, for 1976 as  a whole,  was  only 
0.5 per cent higher than a year earlier. The vol-
ume  of new business investment declined  by 
3.1  per cent in  1976;  but after reaching  a low 
point  in  the  present  investment  cycle  in  the 
first quarter,  capital  expenditures  moved  irre-
gularly higher during the remainder of the year. 
Indicative  of the  need  for an  improvement  in 
the business climate was the volume of new in-
vestment  in  manufacturing  industries  which 
reached a low in  1976 some 22 per cent below 
that of 1970.  In  contrast has  been  the contin-
ued high rate of investment connected with the 
North Sea  oil programme. 
The  volume  of  new  residential  construction 
was  virtually  unchanged  from  that  of  1975. 
However,  this  result  derived  from  the  carry-
over  of  dwellings  in  course  of  construction 
from the end of 1975 and in the earlier part of 
1976; after this, activity in both the private and 
public  housing  sectors  was  very  depressed 
and housing starts in the fourth quarter of 1976 
were 32  per cent lower than a year earlier.  In 
the private sector, the  rise  in  interest rates in 
the  second  half  of 1976  posed  problems for 
the Building Societies in  their attempts to at-
tract funds.  Interest rates  on  new mortgages 
were increased with effect from 1 November in 
anticipation of the rise in interest rates offered 
to depositors which followed a few weeks later. % 
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Chart II  - Elements of gross fixed investment (1) 
Percentage change 1976/1975 at current prices, 
based on amounts in  national currencies 
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Uncertainty over the availability of funds for fi-
nancing  new  construction tended  to limit the 
willingness  of  private  builders  to  construct 
housing  without  sales  being  assured.  In  the 
public sector, the introduction in July of curbs 
on  local  authorities'  housing  schemes,  which 
were part of the more general controls on pub-
lic sector expenditure, were a significant con-
straint on  new public authority housing in  the 
latter part of 1976. 
The volume of public authority expenditure on 
other  forms  of fixed  investment  declined  by 
some 14.5 per cent in  1976 and was almost at 
the same level in real terms as a decade earlier. 
The reduction last year was due to two factors; 
the series of decisions to curtail central and lo-
cal  Government expenditures taken  from  late 
1975 onwards bore most heavily on discretion-
ary capital expenditures and secondly the suc-
cess  of the  revised  system  of administrative 
controls on  departmental budgets which  held 
expenditures within the reduced budgets. 
The  curtailment  of capital  expenditure  by  the 
U.K. public authorities was in sharp contrast to 
the  policy followed  in  Italy,  where  public  au-
thority capital expenditures increased by some 
32 per cent in value in 1976, continuing the very 
rapid  expansion  of  investment  by  the  public 
sector in recent years. A major stimulative pro-
gramme  announced  in  August  1975,  intro-
duced  a new series  of public works  projects 
and  unlike  changes  of  policy  in  some  other 
Community  countries  which  have  sought  to 
restrain investment by the public sector, there 
was  no  cutback in  capital  spending  in  Italy in 
response to commitments to limit the  growth 
of the public sector deficit. 
Business capital expenditures rose rather less 
than  those of public authorities. The  increase 
was 20.1  per cent in value terms in  1976 which 
implies, if one excludes the rise in prices, only 
a marginal  increase  of perhaps  1 per cent in 
volume.  Conflicting  trends  limited  a clear-cut 
advance  in  business  investment,  despite  the 
severe  decline  in  real  terms  in  the  previous 
year.  On  the  one  hand,  industrial  output and 
exports were  particularly buoyant in  1976,  the 
first rising  by  over 12 per cent in  volume and 
the second by some 33 per cent in value terms. 
At the same time it appears that company prof-
itability rose  during the  course of 1976,  albeit 
from a very low base, due in part to a rise in de-
mand  which  enabled  prices  to  be  increased 
and in part to the much slower growth in labour 
costs per unit of output.  It has  also  been  the 
case that the rise in labour costs in recent ye-
ars  and,  furthermore, the high potential  costs 
involved in any eventual redundancies have en-
couraged  companies  to increase  their capital 
intensiveness  without  necessarily  adding  to 
their work-force.  A  by-product  has  been  the 
continued  rise  in  unemployment  in  1976.  De-
spite the increase in output, capacity utilization 
remained  relatively low at about 75 per cent at 
end-1976  compared  with  68  per  cent  in  the 
fourth quarter 1975.  Similarly,  it was  clear that 
much of the rise in industrial output was linked 
to a once-for-all rebuilding of business invento-
ries  which,  correspondingly,  overemphasized 
the  recovery  in  underlying  demand.  A further 
factor which  may  well  have  influenced  invest-
ment  decisions  at  the  margin,  was  the  very 
high interest rates  (more than 20 per cent for 
most of the  second  half  of 1976)  payable  on 
new bank loans by businesses. 
New  residential  construction  last year  contin-
ued to be affected, as in 1975, by rent controls. 
Total housing investment rose by almost 18 per 
cent in value,  which implied a small  decline in 
real  terms  of about one  per cent.  A factor in 
this  decline  was  undoubtedly  the  very  high 
rates  payable  on  mortgage  loans  which,  with 
the rent freeze, offset the incentives for private 
proprietors to expand investment in accommo-
dation for renting. But in total the volume of re-
sidential  construction,  both  in  the  public  and 
private sectors, was stimulated by the Govern-
ment  programmes  introduced  in  mid-1975. 
Public sector housing, although contributing a 
small  share  of  total  residential  construction, 
showed the strongest growth as a result of the 
injection of public funds for social housing pur-
poses. 
In  Ireland the increase of about 28 per cent in 
1976 in  the value  of public authorities' invest-
ment, as in Italy, reflected the adoption of poli-15 
Table 3  - Shares of capital Investment In Community countries  C) 
Gross fixed investment 
Gross 
Domestic  Sectoral shares in O/o 
Countries  Product  As Ofo of gross 
at current  domestic  Business  Housing  Investment 
market prices  product  by public  investment  construction  authorities 
Germany, OM milliards 
1975  1 029.4  21  54  27  19 
1976  1121.3  21  55  28  17 
France, Ffrs milliards 
1975  1 437.1  23  51  34  15 
1976  1657.4  23  51  33  16 
United Kingdom, £ millions 
1975  103 294  20  65  20  15 
1976  120 911  19  67  20  13 
Italy, Lit milliards 
1975  114 215  21  55  29  16 
1976  142128  20  55  28  17 
Netherlands, Fl milliards 
1975  205.4  21  58  24  18 
1976  232.9  20  56  25  19 
Belgium, Bfrs milliards 
1975  2289.4  22  57  28  15 
1976  2544.4  21  51  33  16 
Denmark, Dkr milliards 
1975  203.7  20  62  21  17 
1976  232.8  22  62  23  15 
Ireland, £1r millions 
1975  3666  24  54  26  20 
1976  4473  24  55  25  20 
Luxembourg, Lfrs milliards 
1975  81.7  29  47  28  25 
1976  87.5  28  46  25  29 
Total Community  1975  1 086.1  21  56  28  16 
u. a. milliards  1976  1 237.8  21  56  28  16 
(')  This table is based on estimates, at current prices, of orders of magnitude. Strict comparisons of gross 
fixed investment cannot validly be made because of differences of definition and composition from one 
Member Country to another. 
See •principa/Sources"2.b, 3.b, 4.b, 5.b, 6.b, 7.c, 8.b, 9.b, 10.a. 
cies  aimed  at  reducing  unemployment.  Nev-
ertheless the Irish authorities' capital expendi-
ture did not expand to the extent budgeted for 
the year. 
The  weak point in  investment was the volume 
of new residential construction which decltned 
by perhaps more than 5 per cent in 1976 but in-
creased  in  value  by  18  per cent.  The  volume 
decline was shared by the private and local au-
thority housing sectors, both of which experi-
enced  a decrease  in  the  numbers  of houses 
started and completed. The closure of the As-
sociated  Banks  during  the  summer  months 
may have  contributed to the difficulties of the 
housing market, both from the point of view of 
builders  operating  on  borrowed funds  and  of 
house-owners unable or unwilling to conclude 
financial  commitments  at  such  an  uncertain 
time. 
Business capital investment on the other hand 
was perhaps the most expansive sector of the 
Irish  economy  in  1976  with  growth  in  value 16 
terms of about 24  per cent.  Much of this up-
surge consisted in the inflation of capital goods 
prices, and it appears that a few large projects 
formed the  bulk of the growth in  business in-
vestment. There was a notable expansion of in-
vestment  in  the agricultural  sector which  may 
have been associated with the increase of farm 
incomes  in  1975.  The  substantial  increase  in 
export orders for industrial products may  also 
have  required  some  extension  of capacity for 
certain industries even though the seriousness 
of the  unemployment  situation  suggests  that 
many firms were  not working close to full  ca-
pacity.  A  further  contribution  to  new  invest-
ment no doubt derived the success in  attract-
ing new industry from abroad by means of gen-
erous  investment  and  tax  credits  particularly 
for  industries  engaged  in  production  for  ex-
port. 
Business investment played an  even  more im-
portant role  in  France.  The  growth  in  the  vo-
lume of business investment (excluding hous-
ing)  in  France  during  1976  of  7.3  per  cent, 
which  followed  a  decline  of  7.2  per  cent  in 
1975, was very largely due to the stimulation of 
investment  by  public  enterprises  through  the 
apportionment, ·under  the  plan  introduced  in 
September  1975  for  promoting  economic  re-
covery, of FF  13 milliard of budgetary funds for 
purchasing plant and  machinery for the  public 
sector.  In  the  same  plan  a stimulus was  also 
given to private enterprises through the  grant 
of tax  concessions  for investment  in  produc-
tive  capacity  amounting to  FF  2.8  milliard.  ln-
verment activity by private enterprises as  well 
as  by  public  enterprises  consequently  rose 
during  the  first half of 1976.  The  vehicle  con-
struction industry, and the distributive and ser-
vice industries increased their fixed investment 
during 1976 more than other industrial sectors. 
Later in the year, however, the outlook for prof-
it margins became more uncertain; wage costs 
continued to rise strongly - hourly wage rates 
increased by 15 per cent in  1976  - even after 
prices were frozen until the end of the year un-
der  the  "Barre"  anti-inflationary  plan  and  in-
creases in  interest rates put up the cost of in-
vestment  at  a  time  when  there  was  surplus 
productive capacity in  most industrial sectors. 
Not surprisingly private  enterprises tended  to 
defer  the  implementation  of  their  investment 
plans. 
Possibly as a consequence of the decline in in-
vestment in  dwellings during 1975 the number 
of housing completions fell  in  1976.  However, 
the  number of authorizations for building  new 
dwellings  began  to  rise  again  from  the  first 
quarter of 1976 onwards. This upswing was not 
particularly vigorous because of the  uncertain 
economic  outlook  and  generally  low  level  of 
confidence and  so investment in  housing con-
tinued  to decline  in  volume  last year.  As  in  a 
number of other Member Countries of the Eu-
ropean  Community,  however,  the  demand  for 
individual housing units increased while that for 
apartment blocks fell. 
Fixed  investment  by  the  public  authorities, 
which  had  expanded rapidly,  by 10.5  per cent 
in  volume,  during 1975 as  part of the  effort to 
restimulate the economy, fell back to an annual 
rate of 5.4 per cent during 1976 and was slow-
ing even more towards the end of the year. The 
pace  of this expansion  appears to have  been 
accompanied  by an  increase in  building costs 
of about 14 per cent in  1976 after having  risen 
by just over 7 per cent the previous year.  One 
of the  main  elements  in  the  inflation  of costs 
was  hourly  wages  of  construction  workers, 
which  had  increased  by  14  per  cent  during 
1975  and  rose  by  a further  19  per  cent  last 
year. 
The growth of business investment in  Germany 
was  at  about  the  same  rate  as  in  France  al-
though  the  economy had  moved  further tow-
ards economic recovery.  The  volume  of busi-
ness investment in  1976 rose by about 7.5 per 
cent compared with a decline of 1.3 per cent in 
the  previous year.  The  most notable improve-
ment was in the form of investment in new ma-
chinery and equipment, mainly intended for ra-
tionalization  and  replacement  rather  than  in 
new additions to capacity. After fluctuations in 
the  earlier  months of the  year,  investment  in 
capital equipment picked up considerably from 
the  autumn  onwards.  As  a result  new orders 
received  by firms  supplying  capital  goods on 
the domestic market rose sharply towards the end  of 1976,  and  the value  of imported capital 
goods increased  by  19  per cent in  the fourth 
quarter 1976 compared with a year earlier. 
Industrial  firms were  on  average  operating  at 
81.2  per  cent  of  capacity  in  October  1976; 
while  this  represented  some  improvement 
compared with a year earlier, the degree of un-
utilized capacity acted as  a constraint on  new 
construction  in  some  industries.  The  invest-
ment  premiums  on  new  construction  offered 
by  the  Government  (until  mid-1977  or a year 
longer  than  a  similar  concession  on  capital 
equipment) encouraged a rapid rise in the first 
half of 1976  in  permits to build, but these de-
clined  later  in  the  year.  In  1976  as  a whole, 
however,  the  volume  of  new  business  con-
struction rose by rather more than a year earli-
er. 
New  housing  construction  rose  in  volume 
terms by 6.7 per cent in 1976; but this improve-
ment only partly compensated for the 10.4 per 
cent  reduction  experienced  by  this  sector of 
investment in  1975. The  turn-around neverthe-
less  indicated  a rise  in  demand  from  families 
for housing and the effects of the provision of 
public  funds  for  modernisation.  In  general, 
there  do  not  appear  to  have  been  any  con-
straints  from  the  financing  point  of  view  as 
mortgage funds were in plentiful supply at low-
er interest rates than for many years. The  patt-
ern of new house construction shows a contin-
uation of the shift away from multi-unit housing 
and  towards  detached  and  semi-detached 
dwellings. Demand for multi-unit housing again 
fell, probably because the current rent act pre-
vents  property  companies  or  individual  lan-
dlords from  charging  rents  sufficient to cover 
costs. 
The volume of new capital expenditures by the 
public authorities  contracted  by almost 4 per 
cent in  1976  and  even  in  value  terms was  1.4 
per cent lower than  in  the  previous year.  The 
public  authorities  have  sought  to  contain 
discretionary expenditures so as  to achieve  a 
further  reduction  in  the  heavy  cash  deficits 
which were largely the result of lower tax reve-
nues  and  social  security contributions  during 
the recession and of steeply rising expenditure 
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on extensive programmes for sustaining econ-
omic activity as  well  as  on  social security dis-
bursements by the Federal, Lander and munici-
pal authorities during 1975 and 1976. As capital 
projects constitute a major portion  of discre-
tionary expenditures,  the  impact of budgetary 
curbs  on  the  investment  programmes  of the 
public authorities has  been  particularly heavy. 
In  addition  certain  infra-structural  investment 
such as in hospitals and schools appears to be 
catching up with demand. 
Fiscal incentives in Denmark aimed at reducing 
unemployment  resulted  in  a higher growth  in 
the volume  of business investment than  else-
where in  the Community. The  rise  of about 18 
per cent in volume terms, however, followed a 
sharp decline in  1975 of 14 per cent. Industrial 
output increased by about 8 per cent in 1976 in 
response to the rapid  expansion  of consumer 
demand  on  the  home  market and  the  rise  of 
export  sales  of  about  7  per  cent  in  volume 
terms.  This  increase  was  accompanied  by  a 
gain  in  profitability in  1976  after a depressing 
year for company earnings in 1975. As a result, 
there was increased willingness on  the part of 
businesses  to envisage  additions  to  capacity 
and  to  commit  funds  for  new  investment. 
These factors were reinforced by the tax reliefs 
on  new investment  (up to 20  per cent reduc-
tion  on  taxable  profits  for  investments  made 
before  end-1976),  subsidies and  loan  guaran-
tees granted by the Government in the autumn 
of 1975 and  extended further in  August 1976. 
Since these fiscal incentives are to be reduced 
in 1977, this may tend to dampen the pattern of 
.investment in the current year. Unlike in anum-
ber of other Community countries  where  the 
recovery  in  investment  has  been  directed 
mainly  towards  additions  to  machinery  and 
equipment,  the  expansion  of new  capital  ex-
penditures  in  Denmark  last  year  occurred 
equally in the construction sector. The amount 
of new industrial and  commercial buildings un-
der  construction  was  27  per  cent  higher  in 
1976 than  in the previous year. 
A  quite  pronounced  pattern  was  evident  for 
new  residential  construction  in  1976.  Late  in 
the  previous  year  and  in  the  first  quarter  of 18 
1976 the  housing  sector was  favourably  influ-
enced by the lower VAT rate applicable at that 
time and  by the longer payment periods avail-
able  temporarily  on  mortgages  for  houses 
commenced before the 1st April. Subsequent-
ly,  the number of starts on  new housing units 
declined  from  the  rate  of  the  previous  year, 
perhaps  partly as  a consequence  of the  high 
mortgage interest rates charged in the second 
half of 1976.  However, the number of dwelling 
units under construction was  generally rather 
higher than  in  1975 and the volume of new re-
sidential investment rose by about 27 per cent 
in  1976.  Statistics  of expenditure  on  housing 
include  reconstruction  work  which  expanded 
considerably last year. 
The  public  authority  sector  contributed  less 
than  others  to overall  investment  growth  last 
year,  but  nonetheless  capital  expenditures 
rose by about 4 per cent in  real  terms and  by 
11  per cent in value. Although the Government 
was  active  in  expanding  certain  public works 
programmes with a high  employment content, 
the need to contain discretionary expenditures 
in  view  of  the  very  large  budget  deficit 
undoubtedly  limited  the  scope  for expanding 
investment. 19 
CHAPTER 2 
FINANCING OF INVESTMENT 
2.1  THE  FINANCIAL BACKGROUND 
In early 1976 the scene was set for a high rate 
of activity on capital markets as monetary poli-
cies were accommodating, short-term interest 
rates  and  bond  yields  were  on  a  downward 
trend,  and  capital  markets  were  receptive  to 
the  flow  of  new  issues.  However,  pressures 
soon  developed  on  currency  exchange  rates 
then prevailing throughout the Community, and 
indeed the Italian foreign exchange market was 
closed for 6 weeks early in the year,  such that 
capital markets were constrained by the back-
wash  of events and  the reactions of monetary 
policy to these  essentially external difficulties. 
Currency  pressures  occurred  mainly  during 
two  periods  of the  year,  from  mid-January to 
March  and  from  late  August  to mid-October. 
Furthermore, it became evident during the year 
that the stimulative Government policies intro-
duced  during  the  economic  recession  were 
raising the size of the public sector's financing 
requirement in some Member Countries. 
In  many  countries  short-term  money  market 
rates  rose  higher than  long-term  bond  yields 
and at such times investors tended to neglect 
the  bond  markets  as  funds  moved  into  more 
profitable, shorter term instruments. It is hardly 
surprising, therefore, that total issues of secu-
rities in 1976 did not quite match the very large 
amount  of  issues  in  the  previous  year.  With 
sometimes difficult issue conditions prevailing 
on  capital  markets during periods of the year, 
the proportion of bank credits in the total of fi-
nancing in 1976 increased in relation to that of 
new bond and share issues  - as can  be seen 
in Table 5.  In contrast, new public bond issues 
on the "European" international market rose by 
105 per cent in 1976 in response to the declin-
ing trend of yields on that market and an abun-
dance of funds seeking investment outlets. 
Stimulative Government policies, while achiev-
ing their objective of raising economic growth, 
also  resulted  in  some  instances  in  higher im-
port  propensities  and  a  deterioration  of  the 
current account deficit of the  balance  of pay-
ments.  At  the  same  time  latent  inflationary 
pressures were aggravated  in  some  countries 
either by the economic expansion or by the in-
creased cost in domestic currency of imported 
goods resulting from the decline  in  exchange 
rates. Consequently, monetary policy in a num-
ber of Member Countries had  to be  tightened 
during  the  year,  despite  the  continued  exis-
tence of high unemployment. 
The tightening of monetary policy, more partic-
ularly when this coincided with periods of cur-
rency pressure, resulted in  very sharp rises in 
interest rates in the United Kingdom,  Italy and 
Denmark.  Interest  rates  also  rose  in  Ireland 
largely  as  a result  of the  close financial  links 
with  the  United  Kingdom.  The  rise  in  bond 
yields  in  these  countries was  almost continu-
ous  from  February  until  October,  as  can  be 
seen from  Chart Ill. In  the  last two months of 
the year interest rates in these countries start-
ed  to  decline,  thereby  encouraging  a  resur-
gence of issue activity on most bond markets. 
In  France,  the  authorities  raised  short-term 
money  market  rates  in  defense  of  the  ex-
change rate in the first and third quarters of the 
year; bond yields were initially little affected but 
tended  to  edge  higher from  the  summer  on-
wards. Rather similar exchange rate pressures 
affected interest rates  in  Belgium and  Luxem-
bourg and bond yields moved irregularly higher 
during the year. In the Netherlands, bond yields 
moved lower in the first few months of 1976 in 
line  with  comparable  rates  in  Germany.  But 
currency pressures during the summer months 
raised yields abruptly and they did not decline 
again until the realignment of currencies within 
the  "Snake"  agreement  in  mid-October.  Ger-
many was  the only  Member Country in  which 20 
bond  yields  showed  a  clear-cut  decline  over 
the balance of the year. 
In the opening months of 1976 the external and 
domestic  monetary  situation  in  the  United 
Kingdom was relatively stable, buttressed by a 
drawing on the International Monetary Fund oil 
facility.  Interest rates  declined  during the first 
two months of the year and  a sizeable amount 
of  bond  and  share  issues  was  absorbed  by 
capital markets. 
But from  early March until the end  of May the 
external  value  of  sterling  slid  rapidly,  losing 
some  12  per cent whether valued  against the 
U.S.  dollar or a trade-weighted basket of other 
currencies.  This  slide  was  checked  in  early 
June  by  the  announcement  that  the  Govern-
ment  had  arranged  a $ 5 300  million  stand-by 
credit over three months (but extendable) from 
major creditor countries. In  the meantime, the 
monetary  authorities  sought  to  rebuild  the 
short-term interest rate differential in favour of 
the U.K.  so as to discourage capital outflows. 
During  this  period  of rising  interest  rates  the 
market in fixed interest securities turned hesit-
ant.  Concern also began to be  shown that the 
growth of the  public sector financing  require-
ment would add to inflationary pressures. Influ-
enced  by  this,  the  Government  announced 
plans in July to limit the growth of expenditures 
(mostly capital spending)  in  the  1977-78 fiscal 
year and  to hold  the  expansion  of the  money 
supply,  broadly defined,  to about  12  per cent 
for the year to end-March 1977. By September 
it was  becoming evident that the money stock 
was  increasing  at  a rate  greatly  in  excess  of 
this  target,  due  to  the  slowing  of  gilt-edged 
sales  to th·e  non-bank public during the  sum-
mer months and to more lending by the banks. 
The resultant blow to confidence brought ster-
ling under renewed pressure in September and 
October when the exchange rate fell  by a fur-
ther 10 per cent on a trade-weighted average. 
A  further  tightening  of  monetary  policy  was 
therefore found to be necessary. Two separate 
increases in  special deposits were required to 
be  made  by the  banks with the  Bank  of Eng-
land,  amounting to £  750  million between  late 
September  and  early  November;  but,  while 
these  measures  severely  reduced  banks'  li-
quidity,  they  did  not  immediately  constrain 
bank lending. Also in November came the rein-
troduction of a system (known as the "corset") 
of supplementary reserve requirements against 
the  growth  of  interest-bearing  deposits  with 
severe  penalties on any  growth above a given 
ceiling. This measure was  aimed  at  discourag-
ing  too rapid  a rate  of increase  in  the  money 
stock and  in  bank lending, without necessarily 
raising  interest rates.  During the same  month, 
in  a move  to strengthen sterling, new lending 
to finance trade between third countries in  the 
former Sterling  Area  was  prohibited.  The  fur-
ther step taken by the Government to agree in 
December the terms and conditions for obtain-
ing a S.D.R. 3 360 million stand-by credit, draw-
able in stages over a two year period, had little 
impact on the capital market in what remained 
of 1976 but was one of the  main  influences in 
the restoration of confidence in  early 1977. 
The two periods of tension, from March to May 
and from September to November, were char-
acterised by increases in yields on medium and 
long-term  securities as  well  as  sharp  rises  in 
short-term interest rates.  Early in  the year the 
base lending rate of the London clearing banks 
declined from 11  per cent to reach 9.5 per cent 
by the end of February before rising to 10.5 per 
cent three months later;  between January and 
May  yields  on  medium-term fixed  interest se-
curities issued by local authorities rose by a full 
percentage point to just over 14 per cent (an-
nual compounding of interest). September and 
October  saw  three  further  rises  in  the  base 
lending rate of the clearing banks which took it 
to  14  per  cent.  During  these  two months  the 
Bank of England's minimum lending rate, which 
had  been  increased in  May to 11.5 per cent in 
reflection  of  money  market  conditions,  was 
raised  in  two stages to the record figure of 15 
per cent. Meanwhile the average yield on medi-
um-term  local  government  securities  climbed 
to about  16  per cent (annual  compounding of 
interest).  In  the  last  two  months  of the  year, 
however,  yields  were  tending  to fall,  a move-
ment which encouraged non-bank investors to 
take  up  Government  securities  on  a massive 21 
Table 4  - Methods of financing the fixed investment of enterprises In the Community 
(Provisional) 
(Percentages) 
Annual 
average 
1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1972-1976 
I.  Depreciation  48.4  48.4  52.6  58.2  57.5  53.0 
II.  Long- and medium-term 
external resources raised on 
national capital markets  18.7  19.0  12.0  20.7  16.8  17.5 
of which: 
shares  4.8  4.0  2.7  4.4  3.8  4.0 
bonds  13.9  15.0  9.3  16.3  13.0  13.5 
Ill.  Other resources including net 
self-financing and bank and 
other credits  32.9  32.&  35.4  21.1  25.7  29.5 
Total financing for gross 
fixed capital formation  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
See "Principal Sources" 1.a, 2.a and b, 3.a, band c, 4.a and b, 5.a and b, 6.a and b, ?.a, band c, 8.a and b, 9.a 
and b. 
scale towards the end of 1976 and to continue 
to do so  in  1977. 
The  capital  market and  availability  of credit in 
Italy were also seriously affected by a tighten-
ing of monetary policy aimed at correcting ex-
ternal  disequilibrium  and  alleviating  pressures 
on  the  exchange  rate.  Monetary  policy  re-
mained restrictive throughout the year and had 
to be supplemented from time to time by direct 
administrative measures. 
Among these measures was the closure of for-
eign exchange markets for a period of 6 weeks 
from  21  January  onwards,  so  as  to limit  the 
loss of reserves resulting from supporting pur-
chases  of the  currency.  The  value  of the  Lira 
vis-a-vis the U.S.  dollar declined by roughly 11 
per cent in  dealings abroad  during the  period 
when  the  official  market  was  closed.  Mean-
while,  the  official  discount  rate  was  raised  in 
several steps from 6 per cent at end-January to 
12  per cent by 18  March.  The  banks  likewise 
raised their base lending rates by 6 percentage 
points  to  18  per  cent  during  March.  Bond 
yields did not react initially with such a large or 
rapid  movement  but  increased  progressively 
from  10.9  per cent in  December 1975 to 14.0 
per cent in June and then stabilized a little be-
low this peak during the summer months. As a 
consequence of the  pressures on  foreign  ex-
change markets, rising interest rates and  tight 
monetary  conditions,  private  investors  were 
virtually absent from the bond market for most 
of the  year.  While  this  reduced  the  potential 
demand  for new issues,  the  requirement  that 
the  banks hold 30  per cent of the  increase in 
their  deposits  in  the  form  of  public  sector 
bonds,  underpinned  the  new  issue  market. 
This  support was  broadened by the  raising  of 
the bond holding requirement to 42 per cent of 
the increase in deposits between end-May and 
end-November 1976. 
However,  monetary conditions were tightened 
by a whole  series  of measures  introduced  in 
February.  The  reserve  requirement  of  the 
banks was raised from 15 per cent to 15.75 per 
cent and, furthermore, a supplementary depos-
it of 0.75 per cent of deposits outstanding as at 
end-1975 was required of the banks. A further 
restrictive  measure  was  the  revocation  of ex-
isting  credit lines  furnished  by  the  Italian  Ex-
change Office to the banks for the financing of 
short-term export credits. Also in February, the 
authorities countered the "leads and lags" ele-
ment of pressure  on  the  lira,  by  reducing  the 
time  allowed  for the conversion  of export re-
ceipts  into  lira  to  15  days  (previously  30-60 
days); this period was cut further in  May. 22 
A scheme of prior deposits on  imports, intro-
duced  in  early  May,  resulted  in  a very  signifi-
cant drain on bank liquidity amounting to some 
Lit  4 000  milliard  between  May  and  August. 
From October onwards, over a period of sever-
al  months, the measure was  gradually phased 
out, thus releasing  these funds to the econo-
my. 
In  order to bolster the official reserves, a tem-
porary  loan  agreement  was  reached  with  the 
EEC  in  March  on  condition  that  an  attempt 
would  be  made  to adhere  to certain  financial 
targets, notably the limitation of the public sec-
tor  deficit.  By  the  autumn,  it  was  becoming 
clear that these targets would not be attained 
without further measures and urgency was giv-
en to their introduction by a fresh bout of cur-
rency weakness in October. During that month 
an  austerity programme was announced which 
sought to reduce the Government financing re-
quirement through  increases  in  indirect  taxa-
tion and  higher public service charges.  At the 
same  time,  the  expansion  of bank  credit  had 
exceeded the target agreed with the EEC,  ow-
ing in  part to the effects of the import deposit 
scheme,  and  the  authorities decided to set a 
strict ceiling on  the growth of bank credit, de-
termined on a monthly basis, from October un-
til March 1977. 
In  response  to the  renewed  pressure  on  the 
currency in  late September and  October, res-
trictive  monetary  measures  were  reinforced. 
Official discount rate was raised  by 3 percent-
age  points  to  15  per  cent  and  bond  yields 
reached a peak of 14.9 per cent in October be-
fore declining to 14.2 per cent at the end of the 
year.  The  bond  market  had  been  recovering 
slightly during the  late  summer,  as  a result of 
the stability in  exchange markets and  in  inter-
est  rates,  but  weakened  again  following  the 
events in  October. 
Balance of payments and  exchange rate  pres-
sures accompanied by high and  rising interest 
rates were also a feature of the financial situa-
tion  in  Denmark.  The  difficulties  with  which 
Danish  monetary  policy  is  normally  faced, 
namely the  need  to encourage  capital  inflows 
as a counterweight to current account deficits, 
were accentuated by the growth of that deficit 
from Dkr 2.9 milliard in 1975 to Dkr 11.5 milliard 
last year. An objective of monetary policy in re-
cent years has been the maintenance of suffi-
ciently  tight  credit  conditions  and  high 
short-term interest rates, to encourage the pri-
vate  sector to seek funds  from  abroad  while 
avoiding, as far as possible, hindrance to dom-
estic economic growth. In support of this poli-
cy,  external  borrowing  by  the  public  sector 
rose from  Dkr 0.9  milliard in  1975 to Dkr 10.2 
milliard  last year,  and  the  consequent capital 
inflows were a major factor stabilizing the ex-
ternal  position.  To  contain  pressures  on  the 
bond  market  the  authorities  reached  agree-
ment  with  the  mortgage  bond  institutes  that 
the latter would keep their new issues in  1976 
within  an  agreed  ceiling.  Nevertheless,  the fi-
nancing  of  the  Central  Government  deficit, 
which was much the same size in 1976/77 as in 
the previous year but much higher than earlier 
in  the  decade,  encountered  some  reluctance 
on the part of investors on the domestic bond 
market in the first half of the year. 
In  following  a policy of neutralizing  excess  li-
quidity the  central  bank  called  for substantial 
Special  Deposits from  the  banks  in  late  1975 
and early 1976, and  started to offer short-term 
deposit certificates for tender with  the  inten-
tion of acquiring additional finance for the regu-
lation of bond markets. The  growth of the ex-
ternal  payments  deficit  in  the  first  quarter  of 
1976 and the extensive sales of foreign curren-
cy  in  support of the  kroner,  contributed  to a 
sizeable  reduction  of  banking  liquidity.  The 
banks  consequently  began  to  sell  securities 
but the effect on bond prices was  reduced by 
supporting purchases by the monetary authori-
ties. Nevertheless, yields in Government bonds 
rose  by  about one  percentage point between 
January and February, and the official discount 
rate  was  raised  by that amount in  mid-March. 
Under such circumstances, non-institutional in-
vestors were  reluctant to take  up  new issues 
and  this attitude extended into April when the 
newly  announced  Government  tap  issues  at-
tracted little support. 
An aspect of monetary policy has been the set-
ting  of  a  bank  credit  ceiling  based  on  loan Table 5- Financing of the non-government sector 
from the domestic market and banking sources 
(milliard units of account) 
Country  1973  1974  1975  1976 
Germany  27.05  23.02  19.57  29.66 
France  22.30  24.20  28.51  33.11 
United Kingdom  20.86  14.08  8.00  14.36 
Italy  20.86  14.07  20.96  22.75 
Netherlands  6.75  8.07  7.84  10.87 
Belgium  3.36  3.60  4.25  5.86 
Denmark  3.98  3.68  3.53  5.25 
Ireland  0.58  0.42  0.49  0.82 
Luxembourg  0.18  0.28  0.28  0.48 
Total Community  105.92  91.42  93.43  123.16 
of which: shares  5.41  3.82  6.82  6.82 
bonds  3.30  2.03  5.12  4.25 
short, medium 
& long-term 
credits  97.21  85.57  81.49  112.09 
See  "Principal Sources" 2.a,  3.a  and  c,  4.a,  5.a,  6.a, 
?.a  and b,  8.a,  9.a,  10.b. 
commitments which has, in recent years,  been 
raised  only by small amounts, thus restraining 
credit growth. This ceiling was  raised by 2 per 
cent at  end-August  but purchases  of foreign 
currency by the  business sector between Au-
gust and mid-October were financed to a large 
extent by borrowing and resulted in a rapid in-
crease in bank lending. The strong demand for 
credit , combined with further strains on  bank 
liquidity  resulting  from  increased  demand  for 
forward exchange cover, raised money market 
overnight rates to over 20 per cent by early Oc-
tober. This coincided with the raising of the of-
ficial discount rate by 2.5 percentage points to 
11  per cent.  These  higher rates  were allowed 
to influence the yield for medium-term Govern-
ment  bonds  but  had  less  effect  on  the 
long-term mortgage bond market. The average 
yield on Government bonds rose from 13.4 per 
cent in  August (annual  compounding of inter-
est)  to 16.1  per cent in  October. A decline  in 
the  official  discount rate  in  December had  no 
direct  effect  on  bond  yields  which  remained 
high until the end of the year. 
These  very high yields on  Government securi-
ties prompted a revival  of investor interest on 
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the  bond  market  and  the  public  sector  was 
able to issue twice the amount of securities in 
the fourth  quarter 1976  as  in  the  three  other 
quarters of the year combined. Contributing to 
the  much  improved  demand  conditions  for 
Government  bond  issues was  the  substantial 
reflux of funds into Denmark following the real-
ingment  of  the  kroner  within  the  "Snake" 
agreement on 18 October. 
After a hiatus in the middle months of 1976 the 
bond  market  in  Ireland also  revived  strongly 
during the final quarter. In early 1976, the finan-
cial  situation  in  Ireland  was  characterized  by 
slack loan demand, a high degree of banking li-
quidity, an  absorptive bond market and  declin-
ing  interest  rates.  These  conditions  augured 
well for the financing of the very large Central 
Government  financing  requirement  which, 
though  it turned  out some  25  per cent lower 
than  originally  budgeted,  still  was  the  equiva-
lent of 11.5 per cent of GNP  in  1976. While al-
most two-thirds of the Government's financing 
requirement for 1976 was met through borrow-
ings from  abroad,  which  amounted  to almost 
twice the increased deficit on  current account 
of the balance of payments, the remainder was 
financed in a non-inflationary manner mainly by 
sales  of  Government  medium  and  long-term 
securities to the  non-bank public and  through 
the  receipt  of  small  savings.  In  January  and 
February  1976  the  Government  was  able  to 
place  a considerable  amount of new bond  is-
sues on  a receptive market. At this time short 
and  long-term  interest  rates  were  declining, 
but they  then  climbed  intermittently until  Oc-
tober  as  conditions  on  capital  markets  hard-
ened. The  Government, however, resumed  its 
public  issues  of bonds  in  the  final  quarter of 
the year when the market began to improve af-
ter the labour dispute which closed the Asso-
ciated  Banks  (these  banks  account for  more 
than  two-thirds  of banking  activity  in  Ireland) 
between  28  June  and  6 September.  The  rec-
overy late in the year of the Irish capital market 
owed a good deal to a parallel improvement in 
the United Kingdom market. 
Bank credit grew rapidly during the  bank dis-
pute,  particularly  to  the  personal  sector  and 24 
the manufacturing industries. Business was in-
evitably  transferred  to  Non-associated  Banks 
and  other  financial  institutions  unaffected  by 
the  dispute but much of the  increase  in  bank 
lending  stemmed  in  fact from  the  Associated 
Banks  as  non-clearable  cheques  drawn  on 
bank accounts during the dispute were appar-
ently accepted to a greater extent than expect-
ed. 
The Government's financing position worsened 
during the  period of the bank dispute, despite 
substantial  borrowing  from  abroad,  because 
most of its revenues were drawn on non-clear-
able  cheques.  The  amount  of  such  cheques 
accumulated  by  the  Exchequer  during  the 
strike totalled some  £1r  230 million or roughly 
45  per  cent  of  the  total  annual  financing  re-
quirement.  The  market  for  new  bond  issues 
was understandably quiescent owing to the dif-
ficulties  of  clearing  funds.  In  the  interim  the 
Government's financing  requirement  was  met 
by drawing down its balances with the Central 
Bank,  by using  its overdraft facilities  with  the 
latter and through previously arranged external 
borrowings. 
There was  also a substantial capital  inflow into 
France during 1976 as may be seen in Table 10. 
The  marked  improvement  in  the  balance  of 
payments and the decline in the rate of inflation 
during  1975 allowed  the authorities to pursue 
relaxed  fiscal  and  monetary policies in  the  in-
terests of stimulating the  economy and  com-
batting  unemployment.  In  1976,  however,  it 
soon  became  apparent  that  corrective  mea-
sures  would  have  to  be  introduced  because 
the revival  of activity began to have a seriously 
adverse effect on the balance of payments, re-
sulting  in  pressure  in  foreign  exchange  mar-
kets against the external value of the currency. 
In addition progress in the struggle against in-
flation  was  checked  and  fears  were  aroused 
that prices might begin to rise more quickly. 
The  authorities  were  faced  with  the  difficult 
task of maintaining  control over the  economy 
while  still  endeavouring  to reduce  unemploy-
ment  and  to  encourage  investment.  The  first 
quarter of 1976 accordingly saw the rate of in-
terest on the ordinary loans of the official long-
term credit institution, the Credit National,  re-
duced  by  one  percentage  point  to  10.5  per 
cent and  the  introduction of a series  of mea-
sures, including an extension of the initial peri-
od of tax exemption and  the provision of spe-
cial credits, to encourage the establishment of 
small and  medium-sized industrial enterprises. 
In  early April, a further step was taken in  mak-
ing available  some Ffrs 2 milliard of budgetary 
resources for lending to enterprises, mainly in 
the steel industry, which were seriously afflict-
ed  by  the  recession, for periods of ten  to fif-
teen years at the preferential rate of interest of 
9.5 per cent. On the other hand, the period for 
term credits for purchases of consumer goods 
was reduced slightly towards the end of March 
as an  anti-inflationary measure. 
Largely  in  response  to  intermittent  bouts  of 
weakness  of  the  franc  in  foreign  exchange 
markets  from  late  January  1976  onwards  the 
French  authorities  reduced  money  market  li-
quidity  to  the  effect  that  short-term  interest 
rates rose  in  February and  March  (the French 
franc  was  withdrawn  from  the  European  cur-
rency  "Snake"  during  the  latter  month).  The 
commercial  banks  raised  their  base  lending 
rate  on  1 April  from  8.6  per  cent  to  8.8  per 
cent. They were to raise it subsequently to 9.2 
per cent on  26 July and  to 9.6 per cent on 27 
September as  their expectations of a tighten-
ing of credit were fulfilled. All these moves fol-
lowed  periods  of  particular  weakness  of  the 
franc  in  foreign  exchange  markets.  Similarly, 
the  Bank  of  France  raised  its  discount  rate 
from 8.0 per cent to 9.5 per cent on 22 July and 
to 10.5 per cent on  23  September with corre-
sponding  changes  in  its  other  rates  in  order 
that these  rates  might remain  effective  in  the 
face of a general rise in the interest rate struc-
ture. These increases in official rates of interest 
were however designed to indicate the resolve 
of the  monetary authorities to defend the  ex-
ternal value  of the currency as well as  to pre-
serve room for manoeuvre. 
An  extension  of the  policy  of limiting  the  in-
crease  in  credit was  foreshadowed  when  the 
Bank of France announced at the end  of April 
that credit ceilings on  bank  lending would  re-main  in  force  until  the  end  of 1976.  Through 
this measure the rate  of growth of the money 
stock was reduced from 15.9 per cent in  1975 
to  12.6  per  cent  in  1976,  well  within  the  in-
crease in  GOP at current prices. 
The  rise  in  short-term  interest rates  resulting 
from these developments had a limited impact 
both  on  the  primary and  the  secondary  mar-
kets. The primary market was particularly active 
at  the  beginning  of 1976  when  conditions fa-
voured borrowers. Yields did not begin to rise 
on the primary market until March but over the 
year as a whole they increased by 0.80 per cent 
to about 11  per cent on new issues carrying a 
government guarantee and by 0.60 per cent to 
11.40  per cent on  new issues without such a 
guarantee.  Yields declined a little on  the  sec-
ondary market but then rose similarly. The fact 
that the real  return on fixed interest securities 
remained positive throughout 1976 contributed 
to the  generally better tone  of the  bond mar-
ket. The long-term credit institution, the Credit 
National, which reduced its interest rate on its 
ordinary loans at the beginning of the year by 1 
per cent was  obliged  to increase  this  rate  in 
October by 0.5 per cent to 11  per cent. In spite 
of  official  intentions  to  hold  the  cost  of 
long-term  borrowing  stable,  these  develop-
ments tended to raise  borrowing costs. More-
over,  when  the Government launched,  as  part 
of the Barre anti-inflationary plan, a Ffrs 3.5 mil-
liard  loan  in  October in  order to  on-lend  the 
proceeds  to  small  and  medium-sized  enter-
prises  at  a  subsidized  rate  of  interest,  the 
terms available to other borrowers on the mar-
ket worsened in  consequence. 
As in  France,  a major influence on the money 
market  in  Belgium  last  year  was  the  occur-
rence of pressures on the exchange rate which 
began  in  February-April,  reappeared  last  July 
and persisted until mid-October. As a result of 
these pressures there were  considerable out-
flows of short-term capital in the first and third 
quarters  of  the  year  which  were  largely  re-
versed  in  the  second  and  fourth  quarters. 
These outflows, however, caused simultaneous 
shortages of funds on  the  money market and 
short-term interest rates rose accordingly. This 
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disturbed  the  normal  functioning  of financial 
markets  principally  by  driving  enterprises  to 
seek funds at longer term. 
The  difficulties of the long-term capital market 
were aggravated by the very large financing re-
quirement of the public authorities as a whole 
which had roughly doubled in two years.  Owin~ 
to the outflows of foreign exchange and the li-
quidity squeeze on the money market,  institu-
tional investors were not always in a position to 
subscribe  adequately to issues  of short-term 
Government  paper  on  the  money  market.  At 
such junctures the Government was forced to 
rely heavily on funds from the Central Bank to 
cover its financing requirements. 
Realizing  that  the  maintenance  of  the  ex-
change  rate  for  the  currency  within  the 
"Snake"  currency alignment would  lessen the 
risk of engendering  increased  inflationary for-
ces in  the economy, the National Bank of Bel-
gium acted in  defence of the franc by tighten-
ing  monetary  policy.  As  from  mid-February, 
and  for most of the year  until  mid-December 
1976,  the  Central  Bank  instituted  a split-level 
rediscount facility with the upper tier of the fa-
cility being  charged  at a rate  sometimes con-
siderably greater than the official discount rate. 
Similarly, for much of the year from mid-March 
onwards, financial intermediaries were required 
to hold  public authorities' securities against a 
determined  proportion  of  specified  liabilities. 
However, the calming of the exchange rate si-
tuation after the realignment of currency pari-
ties  within  the  "Snake"  in  mid-October  1976, 
permitted  the  Central  Bank to ease  its policy 
progressively towards the end of the year. 
Owing  to the  closeness  of the  financial  links 
arising from the Belgium and  Luxembourg Ec-
onomic  Union,  the  Luxembourg  authorities 
have  only limited scope for initiating monetary 
policy  actions  distinct  from  the  Union  itself. 
Furthermore,  the  importance  of  non-resident 
funds in the functioning both of capital markets 
and the financial services sector far outweighs 
domestic sources of funds. 
For example, some 80 per cent of total banking 
assets/liabilities relate to non-residents, under-26 
lining the need for monetary policy initiatives to 
be  selective to achieve the desired impact on 
the  domestic  financial  situation.  With  this  in 
view, the Government announced that it would 
pursue an  expansionary but prudent monetary 
policy  in  1976.  The  ceiling  on  the  growth  of 
consumer credit was abolished on  1 April, and 
the  money  supply  (broadly  defined)  was  al-
lowed  to increase at  an  annual  rate  of 19  per 
cent to December. 
The market for new domestic bond issues was 
active last year, as in 1975, despite the fact that 
long-term bond yields tended to rise for most 
of the year, those on Government securities in-
creasing from 6.80 per cent in December 1975 
to 7.69  per cent in  December 1976.  Although 
the budget was initially expected to be in mod-
erate  surplus (in  fact the out-turn was  a large 
surplus),  the  Government  sought  financing 
early in 1976 by means of its first bond issue in 
three years. 
Long-term bond yields in the Netherlands end-
ed the year very slightly below those at the be-
ginning,  although  they  rose  fairly  sharply  in 
mid-year.  January  1976  saw  a continuation  of 
the easier stance of monetary policy adopted 
by  the  Dutch  authorities  in  the  latter  part  of 
1975 with the dual  objective of providing ade-
quate  support  for  the  nascent  economic  re-
covery and of promoting by means of relatively 
low  domestic  interest  rates  capital  outflows 
which  would  compensate for the  normal  cur-
rent  account  surplus  on  the  balance  of pay-
ments. Non-resident borrowers were freely ad-
mitted in the market for private placements, as 
a means of increasing the outflow of capital. 
However,  because  of the guilder's strength in 
foreign exchange  markets, the first quarter of 
1976 showed on  balance a continued appreci-
able inflow of funds from abroad, which contri-
buted to a substantial growth in  liquidity. After 
the end of the quarter sentiment in foreign ex-
change  markets  moved  against  the  guilder, 
causing a reversal of capital movements into a 
strong outflow which resulted in a deficit in the 
balance  of payments as  a whole.  The  Nether-
lands  Bank  consequently  increased  its  dis-
count  rate  several  times,  raising  it  between 
May and August from 4 to 7 per cent, with con-
comitant increases in rates for its advances to 
banks. The  immediate effect of the latter, wel-
come in view of the rapid increase in domestic 
bank credit and  the  money supply, was  to in-
crease  the  cost of short-term  bank  credit  to 
the  private  sector.  Other  short-term  interest 
rates moved upwards too; rates on 3-month lo-
ans to local authorities, for example, rose from 
a low in  March  of 2.99  per cent to 12.22  per 
cent  in  September.  Yields  on  issues  of 
long-term Government bonds rose more mod-
erately to reach a peak of 10.03 per cent in Au-
gust. 
Under  the  circumstances  a feeling  of uncer-
tainty prevailed in financial markets. The  rever-
sal  of the normal short/long-term interest rate 
relationship had an additional adverse effect on 
the long-term capital market generally and from 
May until the autumn issue conditions were dif-
ficult.  In  order  to  limit  this  deterioration,  the 
market  in  private  placings  was  closed  to 
non-residents  from  May  onwards.  Following 
the return of calm in the foreign exchange mar-
kets after the  realignment  of "Snake"  curren-
cies in  mid-October and  a reduction of capital 
outflows,  the  monetary  authorities  acted, 
through the provision of special loans and oth-
er  measures,  to  reduce  short-term  interest 
rates as  quickly as  possible and  so ensured a 
resumption  of  normal  capital  market  activity. 
Discount rate was reduced to 6 per cent at the 
end of November and to 5 per cent on 7 Janu-
ary  1977.  The  return  of normal  market  condi-
tions permitted the  authorities to readmit  pri-
vate  placings  by  non-residents  at  the  begin-
ning of 1977. 
In contrast to the experience of other markets 
within the Community, yields on the bond mar-
ket in  Germany fell appreciably during 1976 as 
a whole, although they rose briefly in the sum-
mer and to a smaller extent than in the Nether-
lands. The prolonged suspension of new bond 
issues by the public authorities in  the  second 
half  of 1975,  allied  with  supporting purchases 
by the Bundesbank, helped to restore liquidity 
and  to  strengthen  the  bond  market  which 
proved to be an  abundant source of financing throughout 1976. At the turn of the year and in 
the early months of 1976, expectations of a de-
cline  in  interest  rates  enabled  a  substantial 
amount of new issues to be  absorbed without 
stress. During the course of the year progress 
in  combatting inflation added to market confi-
dence.  Falling  yields  and  rising  bond  prices 
provided  further  encouragement  to investors 
to  purchase  long-term  securities.  Both  the 
commercial  banks  and  the  non-bank  public 
were active in taking up new bond issues. The 
banks which held sizeable free liquid reserves 
were able to purchase these bonds in  spite of 
a strong upsurge in demand tor credit emanat-
ing from private enterprises. 
The administration of monetary and credit poli-
cy was conducted in a flexible manner through-
out 1976. While the authorities sought to main-
tain support tor the recovery in the economy, a 
number of  initiatives  were  taken  to contain  a 
potentially  excessive  growth  in  the  monetary 
aggregates  which  might  have  added  to  price 
inflation.  Loan  demand  by enterprises was  al-
ready  rising  in  the  early  part  of  1976  and 
strengthened  in  the  second  half  of the  year, 
largely because of the need to finance rebuild-
ing of stocks and  the recovery in  fixed  invest-
ment spending, and in consequence the mone-
tary aggregates began to grow more rapidly. 
However, much of the upward pressure on the 
growth of the money supply was in the form of 
temporary inflows of foreign exchange attract-
ed  to  Germany  by  the  strength  of  the 
Deutschemark within the European "Snake" ar-
rangement.  In  February  and  March  capital  in-
flows  amounted  to some  OM  10  milliard  and, 
on  their  reappearance  between  August  and 
October  brought  in  a  further  OM  7  milliard. 
During the early summer and  after the realign-
ment of currencies in  mid-October foreign ex-
change tended to flow out of Germany. 
In  order to reduce the effect of capital inflows 
in  the  early  part  of  1976  on  the  monetary 
aggregates, the Federal Government moved its 
previously large balances with the commercial 
banks back to the Bundesbank in  March, thus 
reducing excess liquidity in the banking system 
until such time as the funds were disbursed as 
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Government expenditure. With a similar aim  in 
view  the  banks'  minimum  reserves  with  the 
Bundesbank were raised  in  two stages in  May 
and June. In May and again  in July the Govern-
ment  placed  a considerable  amount  of medi-· 
urn-term  notes  directly  with  the  commercial 
banks. This placing of notes with banks not on-
ly  absorbed  liquidity  from  credit  institutions 
and  covered  part of the  budget deficit over a 
longish period, but also placed less of a strain 
than bond issues on a market which had weak-
ened during the second quarter of 1976 when 
declining interest rates turned investors away. 
In  a further move  to reduce liquidity the  Bun-
desbank sold  between  end-1975 and  end-No-
vember 1976 some OM  6.5 milliard of the sec-
urity holdings it had  accumulated  in  the  sum-
mer and autumn of the previous year. 
The  public  authorities'  ability  to finance  their 
heavy  deficits  to  a  certain  extent  other  than 
through  public  bond  issues  helped  bond 
prices.  Almost  twice  as  much  finance  was 
raised through increased sales of Federal Sav-
ings Bonds and medium-term notes in  1976 as 
through  public  bond  issues.  Moreover,  the 
continuation  of a substantial  interest differen-
tial in favour of yields on bonds compared with 
short-term interest rates in  the  money market 
encouraged an appreciable flow of funds, parti-
cularly those held privately, into longer-term in-
vestments. For the first time in tour years a pri-
vate  sector borrower, taking advantage of the 
reduced  cost  of finance,  launched  a  straight 
bond issue in a normal market operation. 
It was only in the last quarter of 1976 that a cer-
tain,  partly  seasonal,  tightness  of  monetary 
conditions  brought  about  a narrowing  of the 
differential between short and  long-term inter-
est rates. This was  due to the higher loan  de-
mand towards the year-end and the reversal of 
capital inflows after the October realignment of 
currencies.  Yields  on  public  authority  bonds 
declined from 8.6  per cent in  December 1975 
to 7.6 per cent in  April but then,  under the in-
fluence  of  heavy  borrowings  from  the  bond 
market  by  the  public  sector,  rose  to  8.1  per 
cent in July/  August. The  subsequent improve-
ment in  the outlook for prices and the mainte-28 
nance  of an  expansionary stance  in  monetary 
policy led to a fresh decline in yields with those 
on public authority bonds falling to 7.2 per cent 
in  December. The  downtrend in  yields on  the 
bond  market  suffered  a  brief  check  at  this 
stage but was resumed in the early months of 
1977. 
2.2  FINANCING IN THE COMMUNITY 
COUNTRIES BY SECTOR: 
PERSONAL AND CORPORATE SAVINGS, 
NEW CAPITAL ISSUES ON DOMESTIC 
MARKETS, BANK AND OTHER CREDITS TO 
THE  NON-GOVERNMENT SECTOR 
The expansion of total net financing to the non-
government sector in  1976, 32 per cent higher 
at  123.2  milliard  units  of account,  appears  to 
have  been  a consequence  of the  recovery in 
capital investment last year. To this was added 
the  increase  in  working  capital  requirements 
resulting from higher output and more particu-
larly the rebuilding of stocks. The increase in fi-
nance  provided  in  1976  was  principally  by 
means of new credits rather than through capi-
tal market issues which nevertheless were only -
slightly  lower than  in  the  previous  year.  New 
bond issues by the  public authorities, as  indi-
cated  in  Table  6,  were  12  per  cent  lower  in 
1976,  more of public sector financing  require-
ments  being  met  through  borrowings  from 
abroad. In a number of countries the launching 
of new bond issues, whether by private or pu-
blic sector borrowers, was rendered difficult by 
rises in interest rates which attracted funds in-
to  shorter-term  money  market  instruments. 
New bond issues by financial and non-financial 
enterprises were also a little lower in 1976 than 
in the previous year, with issues by credit insti-
tutions decreasing by 9 per cent to 23.7 milliard 
units of account. 
As  can  be  seen  from  Table  6,  the  total  of 
financing  made  available  through  capital  mar-
kets declined  slightly to 57.2  milliard  units  of 
account  in  1976,  although  this  amount  re-
mained  more  than  twice  as  high  as  in  1974. 
Share  markets throughout the Community re-
mained  weak  during  1976  because  business 
prospects were  dull  but  new  issues  declined 
by only 3 per cent in 1976 to 8.2 milliard units of 
account.  Undoubtedly,  the  increase  in  com-
pany profitability and the improvement in  sales 
prospects contributed to the attractiveness of 
new  equity  issues.  The  need  for enterprises, 
and  particularly  credit  institutions,  to  rebuild 
their equity to debt ratios which had  been  er-
oded by the high pace of inflation was still con-
siderable in  1976. 
There was less emphasis on precautionary sav-
ing  in  1976  in  most  Member  Countries  than 
earlier in  the recessionary phase  of the econ-
6mic  cycle.  In  consequence  the  flow  of new 
savings was generally a little less than in  1975. 
However, owing to the relatively slow growth of 
loan  demand  by  businesses  (with  investment 
growth  still  subdued  in  many  Member Coun-
tries), the banking system was often in  a fairly 
liquid position at least at the beginning of 1976. 
Consequently  few  constraints  hindered  the 
availability  of finance  for investment  from  the 
banks,  as  credit  controls  generally  excluded 
any  restrictions  on  finance  for  productive  in-
vestment. Since the statistics on  bank credits 
include those at short-term it seems probable 
that  an  important proportion of the  growth  in 
this type of finance was for the purpose of aug-
menting  stocks of raw  materials  and  finished 
products. In view of higher company profitabili-
ty and the relatively moderate increase in busi-
ness investment of 12 per cent in the Commu-
nity as a whole in  1976, it seems possible that 
the  self-financing  capacity of enterprises was 
improved in aggregate last year. 
It can  be seen from Table 5 that the largest in-
crease in net financing in terms of actual value 
in 1976 was in Germany. Furthermore by far the 
largest  part  of the  increase  for  this  country 
came  from  the  extension  of bank  credits,  as 
can be seen in Table 9. Nevertheless there was 
a solid gain in the amount of new shares issues 
by  enterprises,  who  were  no  doubt  encou-
raged  by the  recovery in  business prospects. 
In the Netherlands, also, the increase in total fi-
nancing provided approached 40 per cent, with 
bank credits,  in  this  instance furnishing  all  of 
the expansion. But in the Netherlands share is-29 
Table 6  - Net domestic public issues of securities 
(milliard units of account) 
Type of securities  1973  1974  1975  1976 
Shares  6.63  4.87  8.43  8.16 
of which: 
Credit institutions  1.22  1.05  1.61  1.34 
Enterprises  5.41  3.82  6.82  6.82 
Bond issues  36.90  22.68  55.21  49.08 
of which: 
Public authorities  12.41  5.69  24.06  21.17 
Credit institutions  21.19  14.96  26.03  23.66 
Enterprises  3.30  2.03  5.12  4.25 
Total Securities  43.53  27.55  63.64  57.24 
See  "Principal Sources" 2.a,  3.a  and  c,  4.a,  5.a,  6.a,  ?.a  and b,  8.a,  9.a,  10.b. 
sues,  as  indicated  in  Table  7,  were  subdued 
owing  both  to  the  insufficient  profitability  of 
businesses,  and  to  a lack  of confidence  that 
the  business  sector would  have  full  scope  to 
extend its activities. In France the expansion of 
new financing  was  less pronounced, and  was 
only slightly greater than the rate of inflation. In 
Luxembourg and Belgium, the expansion of to-
tal  financing  was  at  a faster pace  and  in  Bel-
gium in  particular, was  based to a greater ex-
tent on  the  rise  in  bond issues (Table  8).  The 
pattern  of financing  in  Denmark,  Ireland,  the 
United  Kingdom  and  Italy  was  influenced  by 
currency  fluctuations  and  the  high  interest 
rates  prevailing  during  most of 1976.  This  af-
fected bond market financing in  particular and 
amounts raised  by the non-government sector 
through  new  issues  in  1976  were  lower in  all 
four countries  than  in  the  previous  year.  The 
counterpart was  that financing  through  credit 
institutions increased very substantially for all 
these  countries  with  the  exception  of  Italy 
where the rise was more modest. 
In  Germany savings in  the form of savings and 
time deposits (excluding inter-bank accounts), 
savings  certificates  and  savings  with  building 
societies rose only slightly in  1976 following an 
exceptionally large  increase  in  1975.  However 
saving  by  private  households,  taken  as  a 
whole,  fell  sharply in  1976.  On  the  other hand 
companies' retained earnings seem to have in-
creased  substantially last year  in  reflection  of 
the cyclical  upturn  in  output and  the  modera-
tion of cost increases. 
The  strong  demand  for  market  securities  on 
the part of private investors and  non-residents 
set the scene for a substantial increase in  new 
bond issues at decreasing cost by the Federal 
Government in  1976.  Net new bond issues by 
the public authorities as a whole rose by 25 per 
cent. To place this scale of activity in  perspec-
tive,  the  amount  of new  issues  last year  was 
about five  times  higher than  two years  previ-
ously.  New  bond  issues  by  financial  institu-
tions, although declining by  10 per cent, were 
still  appreciably higher than  two years  earlier. 
Both  private  and  public  non-financial  enter-
prises  raised  very  small  amounts  by  way  of 
bond issues last year, continuing the pattern of 
disengagement  from  the  market.  The  favou-
rable  outlook for  profits  and  dividends  aided 
share markets and  new share issues by non-fi-
nancial  enterprises  rose  by 2.6  per cent  (ex-
cluding  the  Mercedes  Holding  company  pur-
chase)  in  1976. A large proportion of these is-
sues  took place  at  the  very  beginning  of the 
year  when  share  prices  were  on  an  uptrend; 
subsequently, share prices declined steadily to 
end about 6 per cent lower in December than a 
year earlier. 
New bank credits rose sharply last year in  re-
sponse  to  the  recovery  in  economic  activity 
and the increased demand for the financing of 30 
fixed investment, additional working capital and 
stocks. The commercial banks commenced the 
year  in  a very  liquid  position  which  was  aug-
mented  by  substantial  inflows  of capital  from 
abroad  during  the  first  and  third  quarters  of 
1976.  Taken  in  conjunction  with  the  reduced 
growth  of their  security  holdings,  the  banks 
had  ample  opportunity  to  expand  their  loan 
portfolios.  Much  of the  new  bank  lending  to 
enterprises  was  long-term,  rather  than 
short-term, in  nature.  In  contrast, the distribu-
tive trades, which  borrowed more from  banks 
in  1976 than other forms of businesses sought 
mainly  short-term  credit  for the  purposes  of 
stock rebuilding. Loans to manufacturing com-
panies, which comprise about one-third of the 
total  of outstanding  loans to enterprises as  a 
whole, were fairly modest in 1976 but this com-
pares with a net repayment of loans in the pre-
vious  year.  Within  the  manufacturing  sector, 
the greater part of bank lending was  to metal 
manufacturers, much of it at short-term, prob-
ably  in  order to tide  these  companies  over  a 
difficult  period  rather  than  to expand  invest-
ments. The counterpart of this was a net repay-
ment  of short and  medium-term  loans  by the 
chemical and petroleum industries which were 
recovering from a decline in markets. 
Personal  savings  behaved  rather  similarly  in 
the  Netherlands. The  rate  of personal  saving, 
taken as a whole, appeared to change very lit-
tle during 1976 despite a sharp increase in the 
component  represented  by  new  savings  and 
time  deposits.  The  growth  of  time  deposits 
consisted at least in  part of a switching of re-
sources from demand deposits in response to 
the rise in interest rates at mid-year. The addi-
tion to saving in the form of savings accounts 
or deposits was  offset by the  growth in  con-
sumer credit, sometimes in  the form  of mort-
gage  loans taken out for the purchase of dur-
able consumer goods. Although the self-finan-
cing  capacity  of enterprises  may  have  recov-
ered only slightly in  1976  - and  still seems to 
be  less than  desirable  - there was  clearly an 
improvement compared  with the  deterioration 
experienced in the previous year. 
New  bond  issues  by  the  Government  in-
creased  by  42  per  cent  in  1976  in  order  to 
cover its large  budget deficit.  In  February the 
Government announced that it would in future 
make issues on the market for private placings 
and  this quickly became  an  important supple-
mentary  source  of financing.  Government  is-
sues of debt certificates (  onderhandse lening-
en)  which  include such  placings amounted to 
Fl  1 380 million in  1976 but because these bor-
rowing operations do not take the form of pu-, 
blic issues, they are  not included in the tables 
of issues on the bond market. The difficulties in 
floating  new  public  bond  issues  during  the 
middle of the year affected private sector bor-
rowers  more  than  the  public authorities.  New 
bond  issues  by  non-financial  enterprises  de-
clined  by 55  per cent in  1976 and  those of fi-
nancial institutions were 32 per cent lower than 
a year earlier. New share issues remained rela-
tively unimportant as a source of finance. 
New loans to the non-government sector more 
than doubled in 1976, primarily under the impe-
tus of increased mortgage credits and of loans 
to the distributive trades to finance the rebuild-
ing of stocks. In addition there was some fur-
ther increase in loans guaranteed by the public 
authorities (in the form of "subordinated loans" 
furnished by the Nationale lnvesteringsbank in 
which  its claims  on  company assets are  sub-
ordinated to the claims  of existing and  future 
debt  instruments),  and  extended  primarily  to 
companies experiencing temporary difficulties 
aggravated  by  the  recession.  On  the  other 
hand there was a small reduction in debt certi-
ficates  (onderhandse  leningen)  issued  by pri-
vate  sector borrowers;  the  amount  borrowed 
through these certificates, which is included in 
the statistics of bank credit, fell from  Fl 8 341 
million  during  1975  to  Fl  8 051  million  during 
1976. About one-quarter of all  loans outstand-
ing  to the  private  sector have  been  made  to 
productive industries, and about a further one-
quarter have been extended to the service in-
dustries.  Loans  outstanding  to productive  in-
dustries  increased  only  moderately  last  year 
but with the  construction and  food  industries 
borrowing  m~re than other sectors. 
Personal savings produced a rather less favou-
rable result in  France than in Germany and the 
Netherlands.  The  sharp  rise  in  consumer  ex-'
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penditure in  France during 1976 was  reflected 
in  a fall  in  the  ratio  of personal  saving  to dis-
posable income to 16.8 per cent from 18.6 per 
cent the previous year. The amount of new sav-
ing placed on  deposit with  savings banks and 
other banking institutions or held in the form of 
Treasury  bonds again  rose,  though  by  only 8 
per cent in  1976 in  contrast to the 39 per cent 
gain  recorded  in  1975.  Company  saving  re-
mained  too  low  last  year  to  provide  an  ade-
quate volume of internal finance for investment 
but the situation was  slightly better in  that the 
self-financing  ratio  rose  from  53.~ per cent in 
1975 to 57.1  per cent in  1976.  · 
The  inadequacy  of  internal  finanbe  proved  to 
be a serious obstacle during 1976 to renewed 
investment activity by private  e~terprises. The 
bond market remained  an  impor1ant source of 
finance but the net amount raiset;t  by such en-
terprises was 13 per cent less thah in  1975. Fi-
nancial institutions in  the private sector in fact 
raised  47  per cent more money tflrough bond 
issues in  1976 than  during the  preceding year 
but private non-financial  enterprfses raised  21 
per cent less at a time when ex~nditure on in-
vestment was  rising  relatively q\Jickly  in  terms 
of current  prices.  Public  ente~prises suffered 
an even sharper fall of 32 per c~nt in resources 
raised through their bond issues. 
The  share  market which would  have  been  ex-
pected to gain in  buoyancy with the degree of 
economic recovery achieved Jn  1976 remained 
relatively depressed because of a general lack 
of  confidence.  Non-financial  enterprises  ma-
nag~d to  raise  virtually  the·  same  amount  of 
capital through share issues in  1976 as in  1975 
but ,financial enterprises raised much less. The 
uncertain economic outlook in· France affected 
foreign investors and their direct investment, in 
contrast to recent years, declinep during 1976. 
The  difficulty  in  obtaining  finance  either  from 
internal sources or from  securiti~ markets led 
to increased demand being made of the banks 
for credit. Excluding credits to local authorities, 
short,  medium  and  long-term  banking-type 
credits  rose  by  15.7  per  cent  during  1976, 
much faster than  in  the previous year.  Most of 
the  increase  in  1976  was  in  medium  and 
long-term  credit,  a  substantial  part  of  which 
was  no  doubt devoted  to the financing  of in-
vestment.  It  should  be  recalled  that  this  oc-
curred  during  a  period  when  the  growth  of 
bank lending was being restrained through the 
imposition of a credit ceiling. The index of bank 
lending subject to the ceiling in fact exceeded 
the prescribed limits in April, May, July, August 
and  December  1976  but,  because  the  banks 
were able to utilise shortfalls in their lending in 
earlier periods, the banking system, taken as a 
whole,  accommodated  the  demand  for credit 
without exceeding the· ,official limits. 
An  increase in  savings in  Luxembourg in  1976 
contrast~d with  the  experience in  most other 
Community members. The amount of time and 
savings  deposits outstanding in  the  names  of 
Luxembourg residents rose  by 22  per cent  in 
1976  after having  shown  a net  decline  in  the 
previous  year.  Profits  of financial  enterprises, 
which include the  numerous banks participat-
ing  in: new issues on the eurobond market, no 
douQt increased rapidly in  line with the expan-
sion of e~robond issues last year.  In  contrast, 
th~  profits  of  non-financial  businesses  re-
mained under pressure, notably in the steel in-
dustry where losses continued in 1976 albeit at 
a reduced rate. 
The  amount of bond  issues by  the  public au-
thorities increased in 1976, following four years 
of net redemptions of existing  bonds,  due  to 
the Lfrs 1.0 milliard issue  by the Central  Gov-
ernme~t  ;n January. Although issues by the en-
terprise ~ector declined by 29 per cent in 1976, 
activity remained very much higher than in ear-
lier  years.  There  was  a  single,  but  sizeable 
share.  issue  in  1976  which  resulted  in  a 
four-fo'~ increase  in  the  resources  raised  in 
comparison with the previous year. 
New bank ·credits granted to the  non-govern-
ment sector rose by 80  per cent in  1976, with 
much  of  the  gain  attributable  to  short-term 
lending.  Owing  to the  removal  in  April  of the 
ceiling on the growth of consumer credits, new 
loans  for  this  pupose  accelerated  sharply  in 
succeeding months. New property loans (both 
residential and  non-residential) were also con-
siderably higher in  1976 but a large part of the growth in residential housing loans was for the 
purchase  of existing  dwellings rather than  for 
new construction. 
As  might  be  expected  from  the  existence  of 
the monetary union between Belgium and Lux-
embourg,  the  availability  of  new  credits  from 
Belgian financial  intermediaries also expanded 
rapidly  in  1976,  rising  by  around  30  per cent 
compared with the previous year.  This  growth 
was concentrated in  new credits to individuals 
rather than in business loans. Owing to the rise 
in  consumer spending,  particularly on  durable 
goods, the amount of new hire-purchase cred-
its increased substantially.  Long-term loans to 
the personal  sector,  principally mortgages, al-
so rose in response to the expansion in  hous-
33 
ing construction that occurred in  1976. The  in-
crease  in  new  mortgages  tended  to  slow 
somewhat in the second half of the year follow-
ing a limitation, as  of end-May,  by the authori-
ties  in  the  granting  of new  credits for house 
construction. 
While  banks  were  extending  more  credit  in 
1976,  the total of gross savings  by  individuals 
and  undistributed  profits  (including  deprecia-
tion)  of enterprises rose  by  12  per cent . But 
the pattern of this growth as between individual 
and corporate savings was the converse of the 
previous year.  In  1976, the profitability of many 
companies improved from the  low base of the 
previous year while the value of business fixed 
capital  investment  rose  only  slightly:  despite 
Table 7  - Share Issues by country 
(milliard units of account) 
Country  1973  1974  1975  1976 
Germany  1.08  1.17  1.98  2.12 
Credit institutions  0.33  0.32  0.60  0.52 
Enterprises  0.75  0.85  1.38  1.60 
France  1.88  1.92  1.82  1.78 
Credit institutions  0.44  0.34  0.25  0.17 
Enterprises  1.44  1.58  1.57  1.61 
United Kingdom  0.32  0.25  2.36  1.77 
Credit institutions  0.08  0.15  0.57  0.46 
Enterprises  0.24  0.10  1.79  1.31 
Italy  2.80  0.95  1.67  1.87 
Credit institutions  0.21  0.07  0.01  -
Enterprises  2.59  0.88  1.66  1.87 
Netherlands  0.05  0.03  0.16  0.06 
Credit institutions  0.03  - 0.08  0.03 
Enterprises  0.02  0.03  0.08  0.03 
Belgium  0.35  0.43  0.38  0.42 
Credit institutions  0.07  0.08  0.06  0.07 
Enterprises  0.28  0.35  0.32  0.35 
Denmark  0.10  0.05  0.03  0.09 
Credit institutions  0.04  0.02  0.02  0.06 
Enterprises  0.06  0.03  0.01  0.03 
Ireland  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.03 
Credit institutions  - 0.02  0.02  0.01 
Enterprises  0.03  - 0.01  0.02 
Luxembourg  0.02  0.05  0.00  0.02 
Credit institutions  0.02  0.05  0.00  0.02 
Enterprises  0.00  0.00  - -
Total Community  6.63  4.87  8.43  8.16 
of which: 
Credit institutions  1.22  1.05  1.61  1.34 
Enterprises  5.41  3.82  6.82  6.82 
See  "Principal Sources" 2.a, 3.a  and c, 4.a, 5.a, 6.a, 7.a and b,  8.a,  9.a,  10.b. 34 
the  need  to finance  considerable additions to 
stocks  in  the  first  half  of  the  year,  the  net 
self-financing  capacity  of  enterprises  moved 
higher. The  rise  in  the  acquisition  of financial 
assets by the corporate sector was,  however, 
artificially  inflated  by  the  arbitrage,  or 
"round-tripping", activities of large  companies 
which borrowed on priviliged terms from banks 
whenever  higher interest rates  were  available 
on the money market. Financial savings by indi-
viduals in 1976 are estimated to have been at a 
slightly  lower  rate  than  during  the  previous 
year: it seems that some redistribution of avail-
able  resources  took  place  with  enterprises 
raising  their  share  relative  to that  of  house-
holds. A further possible reason was that per-
sonal  incomes  increased  at  a  much  slower 
pace than in  1975. 
Much of this saving went towards security pur-
chases.  However,  in  launching  new  bond  is-
sues to finance a large public sector deficit, the 
authorities  had  to offer investors a yield  per-
haps  three-quarters  of  a  point  higher  than 
those on  quoted  public  sector bonds.  Mean-
while the average yield on quoted Government 
long-term  bonds  rose  from  8.80  per  cent  in 
January to 9.35 per cent in May and fluctuated 
a little below this rate in the remaining months 
of last year.  Bond issues by the business sec-
tor  rose  considerably  in  1976,  raising  more 
than  double the  amount  of new funds  of the 
previous year.  In spite of the dividend payment 
restraints imposed by the Government in April 
and  the decline of about 10 per cent in  share 
values in the twelve months to December 1976, 
new share issues in  the first seven  months of 
1976 were about 25 per cent higher than in the 
comparable period a year earlier. 
In  Denmark also the terms of new bond issues 
had  to  be  made  more  attractive  to investors. 
Net  new  bond  issues  by the  Government on 
the domestic market were only 2 per cent high-
er  in  1976,  perhaps  a  reflection  of  the  un-
changed  size  of the financing  requirement.  In 
April,  the authorities announced a new series 
of tap issues but , owing to the lack of investor 
demand  at  market yields then  prevailing,  very 
few securities were taken up initially. It was not 
Chart IV  - The provision of capital 
for the non-government sector 
from  domestic and International sources 
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See  "Principal Sources• 2.a,  3.a  and c,  4.a,  S.a,  6.a, 
?.a  and b, 8.a, 9.a,  10.a and 11. until the fourth  quarter,  after a relative  rise  in 
the  yields  of  Government  bonds  and  an  im-
provement  in  sentiment  on  the  bond  market, 
that substantial sales of these securities could 
be  made.  The  amount of new mortgage bond 
issues  was  in  effect  restricted  by  the  ceiling 
(based on nominal values) agreed between the 
mortgage  credit  institutes  and  the  National-
bank.  While  this  ceiling  was  reached  in  1976, 
the market value amount of net bond issues by 
mortgage credit and other financial institutions 
was some 5.6 per cent lower than in the previ-
ous year.  New share issues, although on  small 
scale compared to the bond market, more than 
doubled in reflection of the temporary improve-
ment  in  business  prospects  apparent  in  the 
first half of the year. 
Business and  private  investors took up  many 
more new bond issues than in 1975, perhaps in 
part owing to the recovery in corporate profita-
bility in  1976 following its severe decline in the 
previous year,  and  in  part to the  attraction of 
higher yields.  It nevertheless appears that the 
savings  rate  of  households  in  Denmark  de-
clined  in  1976  as  consumer  expenditures  in-
creased  by  about  15  per cent  in  value  terms 
and  exceeded  the  estimated  growth of about 
13.5 per cent in  personal disposable incomes. 
This is substantiated to some extent by the re-
duction  of  13  per cent  in  the  growth  of new 
time deposits with the banks. 
The  permitted  ceiling  on  bank  loan  commit-
ments was raised in three stages by a total of 7 
per  cent  in  1976.  However,  the  utilisation  of 
these  loan  commitments  by  the  commercial 
banks increased from 70.6 per cent in January 
to 79.1  per cent  in  December.  Consequently, 
the growth of bank loans was at a much grea-
ter rate than  indicated by the ceiling on  credit 
commitments  and  amounts  outstanding  rose 
by 16.9 per cent in 1976. The pressures against 
the value  of the  kroner  increased  temporarily 
the utilisation by companies of their loan facili-
ties, but the fact that the higher utilisation rates 
were  maintained  and  even  raised  after  calm 
had returned to foreign exchange markets indi-
cates  the  underlying  growth  of  demand  for 
credit. Historically, over the past ten years, per-
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sonal loans have shown the largest increase as 
a proportion  of total  bank  credit outstanding, 
their share  rising from about 7 per cent to 25 
per cent.  In  contrast,  the  proportion  of loans 
granted to the manufacturing sector during the 
same period has declined from 22 per cent to 
15 per cent. These trends may have been influ-
enced by the fact that the business sector has 
been encouraged, by the conduct of monetary 
policy,  to  borrow  abroad  while  the  personal 
sector  has  been  restricted  to  seeking  loans 
from domestic sources. 
In  Ireland as  well  as  in  Denmark  there  was  a 
sharp increase in bank lending. The amount of 
credits  outstanding  to  the  non-government 
sector increased by 25  per cent in  1976, with 
much of the gain occurring during the summer. 
While  it is  likely that some  of this growth was 
linked  to  the  need  to  maintain  companies' 
working  capital  in  the  face  of  non-clearable 
cheques accepted during the  bank dispute, it 
also  appears  that  the  expanded  business  in-
vestment programme was at the root of a reviv-
al in private sector demand for credit, especial-
ly in the second half of the year. All sectors of 
the  economy,  except  the  financial  services 
sector where  a slight  drop was  experienced, 
shared  in  the  expansion  of new  bank  loans. 
Bank  loans  outstanding  to  manufacturing  in-
dustries  rose  by  about  35  per cent  between 
February 1976 and  February 1977, the biggest 
increase  (over  70  per  cent)  occurring  in  the 
textiles, leather and  clothing sector. 
The  total of new savings by the private sector 
in Ireland, by and  large,  increased in  1976 at a 
somewhat lower rate than  that experienced in 
the previous year. To a certain extent the dete-
rioration  in  employment  prospects  until  the 
early autumn may have ensured a continuation 
of precautionary saving  by those still at work. 
Understandably,  savings  with  the  Associated 
Banks  grew  less  in  1976  (since  they  were 
closed for a part of the year) than in 1975; con-
versely, savings growth with the Non-associat-
ed  Banks  and  other financial  institutions was 
rather stronger than  in  the previous year.  The 
placement of funds in the public sector savings 
banks  rose  sharply,  in  part as  a result of the 36 
bank strike and in part as a result of the intro-
duction  late  in  1975  of two  new  index-linked 
savings schemes designed to attract the small 
investor. 
Issue  activity  on  the  domestic  bond  market 
was effectively in suspense during four months 
in the middle of the year.  Partly for this reason 
the  net  amount  of new  funds  raised  through 
notes and  bond  issues on  this market by  the 
public  authorities  totalled  some  52  per  cent 
less than in  1975. Yields on  long-term Govern-
ment  bonds  declined  in  early  1976,  but  then 
rose from 14.3 per cent (annual  compounding 
of interest)  in  February to a peak  of 17.1  per 
cent  in  October  .  Investor  expectations  of a 
Table 8  - Net domestic public issues of bonds In the Community 
(milliard units of account) 
Country(')  1973  1974  1975  1976 
Germany  8.37  8.26  14.43  15.25 
Public authorities  1.13  0.68  2.98  3.94 
Credit institutions  6.85  6.96  11.72  11.18 
Enterprises  0.39  0.62  -0.27  0.13 
France  5.00  2.64  6.43  6.21 
Public authorities  1.28  0.09  0.25  0.77 
Credit institutions  2.33  1.54  3.00  3.03 
Enterprises  1.39  1.01  3.18  2.41 
United Kingdom  3.23  1.24  9.87  9.00 
Public authorities  3.12  1.29  9.71  9.01 
Credit institutions  0.05  0.08  0.11  0.01 
Enterprises  0.06  -0.13  0.05  -0.02 
Italy  14.51  4.26  14.68  8.53 
Public authorities  4.47  1.50  6.30  2.83 
Credit institutions  8.88  2.64  6.68  4.59 
Enterprises  1.16  0.12  1.70  1.11 
Netherlands  0.50  0.85  1.47  1.10 
Public authorities  0.12  0.29  0.64  0.56 
Credit institutions  0.31  0.41  0.64  0.47 
Enterprises  0.07  0.15  0.19  0.07 
Belgium  2.88  2.94  3.72  4.79 
Public authorities  2.03  1.61  2.64  2.81 
Credit institutions  0.64  1.08  0.86  1.45 
Enterprises  0.21  0.25  0.22  0.53 
Denmark  2.18  2.27  3.85  3.84 
Public authorities  0.05  0.01  0.83  0.92 
Credit institutions  . 2.12  2.25  3.01  2.92 
Enterprises  0.01  0.01  0.01  -0.00 
Ireland  0.22  0.23  0.72  0.32 
Public authorities  0.22  0.23  0.72  0.32 
Credit institutions  - - - -
Enterprises  - - - -
Luxembourg  0.01  -0.01  0.04  0.04 
Public authorities  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  0.01 
Credit institutions  0.01  -0.00  0.01  0.01 
Enterprises  0.01  -0.00  0.04  0.02 
Total Community  36.90  22.68  55.21  49.08 
Public authorities  12.41  5.69  24.06  21.17 
Credit institutions  21.19  14.96  26.03  23.66 
Enterprises  3.30  2.03  5.12  4.25 
(')  The issues entered under "Public authorities" include all issues by the Government and public institutions, 
although the proceeds of these issues may sometimes make it possible to grant loans to enterprises. 
See "Principal Sources"2.a, 3.a and c, 4.a, 5.a, 6.a, 7.a and b, B.a, 9.a, 10.b. subsequent decline  in  yields,  which  were  ful-
filled by a reduction from the October peak to 
16.1  per cent in December, and a surplus of li-
quid funds created a favourable climate on the 
bond market for the substantial sales of securi-
ties which the Government made  in  the fourth 
quarter.  New  capital  issues  by  industrial  and 
commercial  enterprises  rose  appreciably  in 
1976, albeit from a low base, while those by fi-
nancial institutions declined. 
Developments in  the  Irish capital  market were 
strongly  influenced  by  those  in  the  United 
Kingdom  where  the  market  improved  late  in 
1976. New bond issues by the U.  K.  public au-
thorities  were  only  2.1  per  cent  higher  than 
during  the  previous  year,  but more  important 
was  the  pattern  of this  financing.  In  January 
and February 1976, declining interest rates as-
sured a substantial uptake of new issues; there 
followed a period of rising or fluctuating inter-
est rates,  lack  of investor confidence  and  re-
duced gilt-edged sales,  particularly in the third 
quarter. The  revival  of the bond market in  the 
fourth quarter coincided with a tendency of in-
terest rates to decline once more which led to 
as large a volume of sales of gilt-edged securi-
ties as  in the rest of the year combined. Com-
37 
panies continued last year to prefer to build up 
their capital base,  and  improve their capital ra-
tios adversely affected by inflation through new 
equity issues rather than  to raise  new loan  is-
sues. Thus, there was a net redemption of loan 
stock by companies in 1976. New equity issues 
were  in  fact  some  17  per cent  lower than  in 
1975 when there was a sharp surge in such is-
sues but remained very much higher than dur-
ing earlier years of the decade. 
New lending by banks to the non-government 
sector was  133 per cent higher in  1976 than in 
1975,  much of this growth being the result of 
borrowing  by  industrial  and  commercial  com-
panies.  It would  seem  probable  that  much  of 
the new lending to this sector was applied to-
wards the rebuilding of stocks in the latter part 
of the year  and  other working  capital  require-
ments, since the increase in the value of busi-
ness investment last year was  relatively small. 
New  mortgage  loans  to  the  personal  sector 
rose by a modest 12 per cent in  1976 and thus 
did not quite match the rate of price increase in 
the residential sector. 
Interest rates payable on deposits by the Build-
ing Societies were slower to decline in the ear-
Table 9  - Short, medium and long-term credits to the non-government sector 
(Variation in amounts outstanding at year's end) 
(milliard units of account) 
of which 
funds raised through security 
Country  1973  1974  1975  1976  issues by credit institutions 
1973  1974  1975  1976 
Germany  25.91  21.55  18.46  27.93  7.18  7.28  12.32  11.70 
France  19.47  21.61  23.76  29.09  '2..77  1.88  3.25  3.20 
United Kingdom  20.56  14.11  6.16  13.07  0.13  0.23  0.68  0.47 
Italy  17.11  13.07  17.60  19.77  9.09  2.71  6.69  4.59 
Netherlands  6.66  7.89  7.57  10.77  0.34  0.41  0.72  0.50 
Belgium  2.87  3.00  3.71  4.98  0.71  1.16  0.92  1.52 
Denmark  3.91  3.64  3.51  5.22  2.16  2.27  3.03  2.98 
Ireland  0.55  0.42  0.48  0.80  - 0.02  0.02  0.01 
Luxembourg  0.17  0.28  0.24  0.46  0.03  0.05  0.01  0.03 
Total Community  97.21  85.57  81.49  112.09  22.41  16.01  27.64  25.00 
See  "Principal Sources" 2.a, 3.a and c, 4.a,  5.a,  6.a, 7.a and b,  8.a,  9.a,  10.b. % 
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Chart V - Short and long-term interest rates 
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- Official discount rate  Short-term interest rate 
on the money market (1)  ··~·······  Gross yield of bonds (2) 
(') The short-term interest rates are, according to 
the countries concerned, the following: 
Germany: rate for 3-month inter-bank loans. 
France: rate for 3-month inter-bank loans against 
private bonds. 
United Kingdom:  3-month sterling lending  rate 
on inter-bank market. 
Italy: rate for inter-bank sight deposits. 
Denmark: no representative data available. 
Netherlands: rate for 3-month bank loans to local 
authorities. 
Belgium:  rate for transfer to banks of 3-month 
cash certificates. 
Ireland: rate for 3-month funds on the inter-bank 
market. 
International European Market: rate for 3-month 
U.S. dollar deposits with London Banks. 
(2)  The gross yields for bonds are those of bonds 
quoted on stock exchanges in the different finan-
cial markets in the Community, the characteristics 
of which at issue come closest to those of the 
European Investment Bank's bonds. 
See  UPrincipal Sourcesn 2.a, 3.a, 4.a,  S.a,  6.a, 7.a,  8.a, 9.a. 
20 
19 
18 
17 
16 
15 
14 
13 
12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
6 
5 
1 
0 40 
ly  part  of the year  than  those  of the  clearing 
banks  and  so  until  August the  Societies'  net 
receipts of funds were relatively high. This situ-
ation was  abruptly reversed in September/Oc-
tober when  the  clearing  banks'  interest rates 
were  raised  by several  percentage  points be-
fore the Building Societies reacted to the gen-
erally tighter monetary conditions, and the so-
cieties'  receipts  fell  drastically  in  the  fourth 
quarter  of the  year.  Personal  savings  in  the 
United  Kingdom  increased  by  10  per cent  in 
value  last year which  implies  some  decline  in 
real  terms, given that the rate of price inflation 
was  significantly  higher  than  that  figure.  For 
1976 as  a whole, the ratio of personal savings 
to disposable  income  decreased  only  slightly 
compared with the previous year, and thus re-
mained at a historically high level. 
Gross trading profits of companies,  excluding 
stock appreciation  but  including  depreciation 
provisions,  rose  by 24  per cent  in  1976.  This 
performance raised  nominal  profits to a point 
only a little higher than in  1973 which implies a 
substantial decline in  real terms in the interval. 
The  limited recovery of profits from the reces-
sion  conditions  in  1974/75  was  probably 
helped by the  recognition  by the Government 
that  some  easing  of the  interpretation  of the 
Price Code was necessary if productive invest-
ments  were  to  be  encouraged.  In  addition  a 
potential threat to the financial position of com-
panies was postponed when the temporary re-
lief from taxation on  increases in  stock appre-
ciation  resulting  from  inflation  was  extended. 
Within  the  total  of  private  and  public  enter-
prises, the gross trading profits of the nationa-
lised industries responded strongly to the new 
directive of the  Government to such corpora-
tions to earn an adequate return on the capital 
invested.  Furthermore,  exporters  seem  to be 
gradually changing to quoting export prices in 
foreign currency and, by maintaining prices un-
changed as the value of sterling declined, may 
have increased the unit profitability (in sterling) 
of their exports. On  the  other hand  construc-
tion  companies  engaged  in  residential  con-
struction have continued to contend with diffi-
cult financial conditions. 
There  appears  to  have  been  a  similar  sharp 
recovery in  nominal company profits in  Italy in 
1976,  admittedly  from  the  very  low  point 
reached  in  1975. The self-financing capacity of 
manufacturing enterprises, based on  a sample 
of limited  dimensions,  recovered  from  47  per 
cent  in  1975  to an  admittedly still  low 70  per 
cent in 1976. Although new savings by individu-
als, as represented by time and savings depos-
its with  banks  and  the  Post  Office  Giro,  de-
clined by 20.3 per cent in  1976, they had  more 
than doubled in the previous year and thus the 
flow  of  new  savings  remained  considerably 
above that of earlier years. While incomes con-
tinued to increase rapidly,  the buoyant growth 
·of personal spending which was a major factor 
behind the expansion of the economy in  1976 
absorbed a greater proportion. A  smaller part 
of the residual saving found its way to the bond 
market. 
The  tendency for interest rates  to rise  in  Italy 
for much  of 1976,  largely as  a result of pres-
sures  on  the  exchange  rate,  created  difficult 
conditions on the bond market and new public 
issues by  both the  public and  private  sectors 
were  lower  than  in  the  previous  year.  New 
bond issues by public and  private enterprises 
declined 27 per cent in  1976 while those by fi-
nancial  institutions  decreased  23  per  cent. 
Capital issues by financial and non-financial en-
terprises were mostly made on the first quarter 
of the year, in September before the renewal of 
pressures on the exchange rate and in Decem-
ber when interest rates had started to decline. 
The  uptake  of new  issues  by  individuals  was 
very much reduced and  almost three-quarters 
of the total of bond  issues in  1976 was  taken 
up by the commercial banks, compared with a 
proportion of a little over half in 1975. This patt-
ern  reflected  the  increase  (to 42  per cent)  in 
the  requirement that  banks  hold  a proportion 
of their new deposits in the form of public sec-
tor bonds. New bond issues by the public sec-
tor  were  however  halved  in  1976  compared 
with the previous year, a result which was attri-
butable to the lack of interest by non-bank in-
vestors in new issues rather than any decline in 
the  public  sector financing  requirement.  De-
spite the decline in share values of about 8 per cent in  1976,  new share  issues by enterprises 
rose by 25  per cent compared with the  previ-
ous year.  This  would  seem  to be  a reflection 
partly of the  increase  in  business  confidence 
during the earlier part of the year, and partly of 
the compliance  by  companies which  had  suf-
fered losses in recent years with a legal obliga-
tion to reconstruct their capital. 
New credits to the non-government sector in-
creased by 25.8 per cent in  1976, but if this is 
related  to  the  rise  in  prices  of some  19  per 
cent,  it  can  ,be  seen  that  the  growth  in  real 
terms was  relatively modest. All of the expan-
sion was  in the form of short-term credits and 
more particularly those arranged in connection 
with the financing  of the deposits required by 
the  controls  over  purchases  of  foreign  ex-
cha_nge.  The  ceiling  on  credit  growth  intro-
duced in  October certainly  restrained  the  ex-
pansion of new credits in  the last few months 
of  the  year.  Furthermore,  the  difficulties  en-
countered by the specialised credit institutions 
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in  placing their bonds with  investors last year 
tended to limit the availability of credit from this 
source. But private enterprises, and particular-
ly small  companies,  as  opposed to public en-
terprises appear to have been the main benefi-
ciaries of the expansion of lending in  1976. 
Loans to manufacturing industries as a propor-
tion of total bank loans outstanding amounted 
to 55  per cent,  forming the  largest proportion 
to manufacturing  in  all  the  Community  coun-
tries.  Loans  to the  non-financial  services  and 
construction  industries  took a further  31  per 
cent of loans outstanding. 
2.3  DEBT ISSUES BY COMMUNITY 
BORROWERS ON THE SWISS AND 
U.S. MARKETS 
The United States capital market which was re-
opened to public issues by foreigners in  197  4 
began cautiously but by 1975 had already over-
Table  10  - The contribution of external capital flows to domestic financing C), 1976 
Provisional estimates 
( +  inflow;  - outflow) 
(million units of account) 
Germany  France  United  Italy  Nether- Belgium/  Denmark  Ireland  Kingdom  lands  Luxembg  (') 
Private long-term capital 
Net direct investment  -762  - 61  - 560  +421  +  34 
Net portfolio investment  -1040  +  281  - 85 
including loans  -139  - 48  -1314  -432  +  329 
Total private long-term 
capital flow  -901  -1040  +  281  - 109  -1874  - 11  +  363  - 85(') 
Public sector long-term 
capital flow, including 
loans, total  +835  +  75  -1328  +  53  - 184  +  95  +1495  +507 
Short-term capital flow, 
total (
4
)  +378  +3504  -2691  +1591  - 227  -510  - 1  +149 
Total capital account of 
Balance of International 
Payments (")  +312  +2539  -3738  +1535  -2285  -426  +1857  +571 
C)  This table is based on national balance of payments data and national definitions, while similar, may differ 
slightly as between countries. In most cases public enterprises have been included in the public sectors. 
(
2
)  Recorded capital movements. 
(
3
)  Residual item. 
(
4
)  Includes net external position of the private banking sector. 
(")  Unidentified flows have been excluded except for France and Ireland. 
See "Principa/Sources"2.a, 3.a, 4.a, 5.a, 6.a, ?.a, 8.a, 9.a. 42 
taken the Swiss market in  foreign issues as  a 
supplier of capital to Community borrowers. In 
1976 when banks and  institutions in  the Com-
munity raised a total of$ 1 200 million, equiva-
lent to 1 065  million  units of account the  gap 
widened further. 
There  were  only  seven  borrowers  from  the 
Community  who  approached  the  New  York 
market  in  1976,  though  some  of them  did  so 
twice. These included the European Economic 
Community itself which raised  $ 100 million as 
part replacement for a floating rate dollar cred-
it,  the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community 
which obtained $ 325 million in  two operations 
and the European Investment Bank which also 
tapped the  market twice in  raising  $ 175  milli-
on.  The  remaining  $  600  million  was  all  bor-
rowed  by  French  institutions,  the  Caisse  Na-
tionals des Telecommunications ($  225 million 
in two operations), Electricite de France ($ 200 
million in two loans), the Societe Nationals des 
Chemins de Fer($ 100 million) and the Banque 
Fran<;:aise  du  Commerce  Exterieur ($  75  milli-
on). 
As  a  general  rule  foreign  borrowers  on  the 
New York  market may  expect to pay  nearly a 
percentage  point  more  than  a  comparable 
domestic borrower making a similar issue. The 
relatively  high yields which  have  to be  offered 
by borrowers other than  first class names,  as 
well  as  more elaborate and  costly registration 
procedures than on the international market in 
Europe, explain why there were so few borrow-
ers  from  the  Community.  In  the  last  four 
months of 1976,  however,  the  terms  of issue 
moved in favour of borrowers. 
On  the Swiss  market in  public issues,  banks, 
non-financial  institutions  and  companies  from 
the  Community  raised  Sfrs.  1 250  million  in 
1976, equivalent to 441  million units of account, 
appreciably  more  than  the  equivalent  of  310 
million units of account collected the previous 
year.  In contrast to the New York market, there 
were  no  fewer than  sixteen  different  borrow-
ers, none of whom was permitted by the regu-
lating authorities to approach the market twice. 
Offering  yields  on  an  issue  of  fifteen  year 
bonds declined during the  course  of 1976  by 
over two percentage points. Reflecting the low 
rate of inflation in Switzerland, yields were less 
than  in  any  other market open to foreign  bor-
rowers.  At the  end  of  1976,  for example,  the 
yield offered on a fifteen year bond was around 
5.55  per cent,  probably over three percentage 
points less than would  have  been required on 
the U.S. market. For most borrowers, however, 
the exchange risk attached to issuing a loan in 
Swiss francs would  probably have  been  grea-
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CHAPTER 3 
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS 
3.1  PUBLIC BOND ISSUES ON  THE 
EUROPEAN  INTERNATIONAL  MARKET  AND 
ISSUES  BY NON-RESIDENTS ON  NATIONAL 
MARKETS 
The  consolidation during 1975 of the recovery 
in the international capital market laid the foun-
dations for a boom in activity last year through-
out which  the  market  was  well  supplied  with 
funds. The  international banks were very liquid 
and  looking for means  of employing their idle 
resources;  some  it  seems  were  buyers  of 
bonds for their own account. Redemption pro-
ceeds from earlier bond issues grew in volume 
in  1976 and  their reinvestment provided a firm 
base  for  new  issue  operations.  The  gap  be-
tween  interest  rates  on  short-term  euro-cur-
rency deposits and  bond yields remained wide 
enough  throughout  the  year  to  encourage 
funds  to  flow  towards  the  bond  market.  In 
combination, these factors led to a doubling of 
the amount of new public issues of bonds (tak-
ing issues managed by domestic syndicates as 
shown in Table II  together with those managed 
by  international  syndicates)  from 5 348  million 
units of account in  1975 to 10 978  million units 
of account  in  1976.  The  change  between  the 
two  years  in  private  placings,  on  the  other 
hand,  was  relatively minor (see  Table  13). The 
statistics of private placings, derived from data 
published by the OECD, may not represent the 
full  extent of such  issues which are  often  se-
cretly  arranged.  They  indicate,  however,  that 
private  placings  have  remained  an  important 
source of finance,  even  if they form  a smaller 
proportion of the primary market than in recent 
years. 
The dollar sector of the international bond mar-
ket continued to be the largest, accounting for 
approximately two-thirds of new issues wheth-
er public or private. New public issues denomi-
nated in  U.S.  dollars more than trebled for the 
second year in succession to reach the equiva-
lent of 6 773 million units of account. Canadian 
dollar  issues  also  more  than  trebled,  thereby 
accounting for 12.5 per cent of public bond is-
sues.  However,  they  remained  less  than 
Deutschemark  issues which  formed  a fifth  of 
the  total. The  popularity of Canadian  dollar is-
sues, in 1976, appears to have been temporary, 
lasting  while  the  currency  stood  above  par 
against  the  U.S.  dollar.  Private  placings  in 
Dutch guilders were 20 per cent lower in  1976 
than in  1975 mainly because of the suspension 
of placings by non-residents between May and 
December.  Issues  denominated  in  other cur-
rencies raised  relatively small amounts. 
Somewhat surprisingly, in view of the intermitt-
ent unrest in foreign exchange markets during 
1976,  little resort was made to issues denomi-
nated  in  units of account.  Issues in  European 
units of account  (the  classic formula  and  not 
the  unit based  on  a basket of currencies)  fell 
by 72  per  cent  between  1975  and  1976.  The 
1975  experiment  of  issues  denominated  in 
Special  Drawing  Rights was  not repeated  last 
year  nor were  any  issues  made  in  European 
Currency Units. 
The  strength of the  international bond  market 
during  1976 was  underlined by the downtrend 
in yields on the primary as  well as  on  the sec-
ondary market, despite the surge in issuing ac-
tivity. Yields on the secondary market in  dollar 
securities declined from just under 9 per cent 
at the beginning of 1976 to just over 8 per cent 
at  its  end;  during  the  same  period  yields  on 
Deutschemark  bonds  fell  from  a  little  over  9 
per cent to about 7.75 per cent. On the primary 
market, average  issuing yields of dollar bonds 
fell during 1976 from about 9.2 per cent to 8.25 
per  cent;  similarly  yields  on  Deutschemark 
securities dropped from just over 8 per cent to 44 
Table 11  - Gross Issues of securities on the "European" International market 
(million units of account) 
Domestic Syndicates  International Syndicates 
1975  1976  1975  1976 
Convertible bonds  - 11  100  654 
U.S. dollars  - - 100  561 
Deutschemarks  - - - 91 
Dutch guilders  - 11  - 2 
Bonds with warrants  - - - 36 
U.S. dollars  - - - 36 
Straight bonds  626  646  4622  9631 
U.S. dollars  - - 2057  6176 
Canadian dollars  - - 409  1288 
Deutschemarks  346  461  1 321  1735 
French francs  28  47  205  42 
Dutch guilders  131  116  - 47 
Belgian francs  66  - - -
Luxembourg francs  55  22  - -
Norwegian kroner (OM option)  - - 34  -
Australian dollars  - - - 17 
Kuwaiti dinars  - - 135  220 
Dirhams/U.A.E.  - - - 24 
European units of account  - - 292  82 
Special drawing rights (SDR)  - - 137  -
European currency units ('~)  - - 32  -
Total Issues of Securities  626  657  4722  10321 
Borrowers In Europe (
1
)  461  310  2649  5204 
Within the Community  401  160  1461  3318 
- European Economic 
Community  - - - 440 
- European Investment Bank  219  11  168  232 
- Commission of the European 
Communities (on behalf 
ECSC)  112  110  87  279 
- Other Community borrowers  70  39  1206  2367 
Outside the Community  60  150  1188  1 886 
Borrowers on the American 
Continent  - - 851  3223 
U.S.A.  - - 167  792 
Others  - - 684  2431 
Japanese borrowers  - - 615  874 
Miscellaneous  165  347  607  1020 
( 
1
)  The geographical classification of borrowers has been based upon the nationality - and hence the loca-
tion of the registered office - of the issuers except for holding companies which are affiliates of foreign 
companies;  these holding companies  have  been  classified according to the nationality of their parent 
companies. 
Source: E. I. B. 
a little under 7 per cent (though with a tempor-
ary  rise  in  mid-year back to 8 per cent when 
the currency appeared to lose some of its pot-
ential for appreciation). 
The  decline  in  yields  was  accompanied  by  a 
sharp increase in the size of a number of loans 
and by a gradual extension of maturities of new 
issues to something  like  the  terms  prevailing 
before  the  oil  crisis  disrupted  the  market  in 
1974. A number of dollar issues had  begun to 
carry, before the end of the year, terms to mat-
urity of fifteen years. In the Deutschemark sec-
tor there was only one  issue (by Norsea Gas) with twelve years to maturity but several issues 
with  a ten-year  term  made  their  appearance. 
The  market also demonstrated its capacity for 
handling really large issues, in  some instances 
of up to $ 300 million in amount. 
Borrowers  in  the  European  Community made 
use of the opportunity during 1976 to obtain fi-
nance from the international capital  market on 
favourable  terms.  Some  3 478  million  units  of 
account were  raised  through public issues on 
the  international  market  last  year  as  against 
1 862 million units of account in 1975. Substan-
tial though this increase was,  the proportion of 
the market total  obtained by borrowers within 
the European Community fell to 32 per cent in 
1976 from 35  per cent the  previous year.  This 
pattern  was  more  or less  repeated  by  Euro-
pean  borrowers outside the  Community.  Bor-
rowers  in  the  U.S.A.,  on  the  other hand,  who 
had  been  largely  absent  from  the  market  in 
1975 returned in  1976 to raise nearly five times 
as much as in the previous year. A large part of 
the  increase  in  issues  by non-U.S.  borrowers 
on the American continent consisted of opera-
tions launched by Canadian  residents, often in 
raising  Canadian  dollars.  Included  in  "Miscel-
laneous" and  accountinq for a substantial part 
of the growth of this item is a $ 300 million is-
sue by Australia. 
The  proportionate  allocation  of  resources 
raised through public bond issues on the inter-
national  capital  market as  between sectors of 
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activity  varied  remarkably  little  between  1975 
and ·1976  in  spite of the doubling of the total. 
The  proportions of the total raised  directly by 
energy and mining, by transport and communi-
cations  and  by  the  public  authorities  in  1976 
were fairly close to those of the previous year. 
The  proportion raised by manufacturing indus-
try,  however, was  sharply lower.  On  the  other 
hand,  the financial  sector and  international in-
stitutions (mostly financial also) increased their 
shares  significantly,  benefiting  from  the  more 
favourable  terms of borrowing. The  resources 
obtained  in  this  way  by  the  financial  sector 
would,  in  the  normal  course  of  events,  be 
on-lent  to  other  sectors,  adding  to  the 
amounts  obtained  by  them  directly  from  the 
market. 
In  this section, apart from the statistics of pri-
vate  placings which,  as  explained earlier, have 
been  obtained from  the  OECD,  the figures of 
public bond issues relate to: 
bonds issued in  one or more countries by 
non-residents,  but which  are  not denomi-
nated in  the currency of the country of is-
sue; 
bonds which, although issued by residents 
of a specific country in their own currency, 
are  expressly reserved for subscription by 
non-residents; 
bonds which, although issued in  a specific 
country by non-residents and  denominated 
Table  12  - Total resources raised by Community borrowers through public issues on 
the financial markets 
(milliard units of account) 
1975  1976 
Net issues on the national markets 
of Member Countries  63.64  57.24 
Issues on the European international 
market(')  1.46  3.32 
Issues on other national markets  0.80  1.63 
Total Community  65.90  62.19 
(')  As the volume of redemptions effected on Eurobonds in circulation cannot be assessed accurately, the fi-
gures given here relate to gross amounts raised. 
Sources: E.I.B. and those on Table 6. 46 
in  that  country's  currency,  are  placed  in 
several countries by the issuing syndicates 
in  so far as  the  syndicates include foreign 
banks; 
bonds  to which  special  monetary  clauses 
are  attached  (units  of  account,  EURCO, 
ECU,  SDR  and  other multiple  currency is-
sues). 
3.2  INTERNATIONAL MEDIUM-TERM 
CREDITS 
The  market in  internationally syndicated medi-
um-term  credits  expanded  by  7 865  million 
units  of account  in  1976  or by  nearly  48  per 
cent.  This  expansion  more  than  matched  the 
increase of about 5 600 million units of account 
in  public bond issues,  although  in  percentage 
terms it was  much less than  the  105 per cent 
achieved by the bond market. International me-
dium-term  credits  thus  resumed  their  rapid 
growth after falling  back in  1975, this time ac-
companying a similar development in the bond 
market. 
Most  categories  of  borrowers  shared  in  the 
greater  volume  of bank  lending  in  1976.  The 
European  Economic Community, for example, 
increased its borrowing from 1 239 million units 
of account  in  1975  to 3 877  million  units  last 
year.  Borrowing  by  public  authorities  in  the 
Community,  including  a  $  300  million  credit 
raised  by  the  Community  itself  in  1976  (and 
subsequently  funded  by  bond  issues  for  an 
equivalent amount), rose  between the two ye-
ars from 467 million to 1 238 million units of ac-
count. The deterioration in the balances of pay-
ments of a number of Member Countries led to 
a reactivation of the policy of securing foreign 
exchange  for national  reserves  through  inter-
national  borrowing  by  public  authorities,  in-
cluding the national  Governments of Denmark 
and  Ireland.  Nationalised  enterprises  (which 
are  classified  as  "enterprises"  in  Table  14  as 
elsewhere in  this review of investment and  its 
financing)  were  similarly  encouraged  during 
1976 to borrow internationally, examples being 
the Post Office, the National Water Council and 
the  Electricity Council  in  the  United  Kingdom 
and  Electricite  de  France.  This  practice  ac-
counts  in  large  measure  for  the  increase  in 
borrowing  by  "enterprises"  in  the  Community 
from  772  million  units  of  account  in  1975  to 
2 638 million units of account in 1976, although 
it is also true that private enterprises obtained 
Table 13  - Private placlngs of bonds on the International market (') 
(million units of account) 
1975  1976 
Currency of Issue: 
OM  746.9  564.3 
Fl  521.8  415.1 
US$  1 367.1  1 880.2 
Other  124.4  71.6 
Total  2 760.2  2 931.2 
Issuers: 
OECD countries  1 871.6  1 265.8 
of which EEC. countries  593.7  466.0 
Non  - OECD countries  217.0  141.5 
International Organizations  671.6  1 523.9 
(') This table is based on OECD data and the definition of private placements is complementary to that of pu-
blic issues compiled in Table 11. However, the definitions of the two may,  in  rare instances, overlap and 
some double-counting may occur. The table covers international markets throughout the world in addition 
to the European international market. 
See "Principal Sources" 11. more  finance  from  this  source  last  year  than 
previously. 
Outside the European  Community,  developing 
countries  borrowed  more  during  1976  in  the 
form  of international  medium-term  credits.  In 
part this was  because  borrowers in  a number 
of petroleum-exporting  countries  returned  to 
the market for funds but there was also an  in-
crease  in  the  number  and  volume  of  credits 
granted  to  borrowers  in  other  developing 
countries.  International  banks  have  improved 
their appraisal  techniques  in  lending  to  such 
countries,  some  of them  having  experienced 
default or near default on the part of one or two 
of their customers. A number of banks have, in 
this  respect,  found  it  useful  to link  the  provi-
sion of finance to the implementation of agreed 
projects. 
Throughout  1976  the  banks  operating  in  the 
market  in  international  credits  maintained  for 
different borrowers much the same scale of in-
terest margins over a specified base rate fixed 
every three or six months (usually the London 
inter-bank offered rate or LIBOR  in short). The 
European  Economic  Community  secured  a  1 
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per cent margin  on  its $ 300  million  credit in 
March 1976, but for most first class borrowers 
in  industrialised  countries  this  meant  around 
1.25 per cent whereas borrowers in developing 
countries were asked to pay between 1.75 and 
2.25  per  cent.  As  the  year  progressed  it  be-
came  clear  that  the  banks  were  highly  liquid 
and, partly because of the low level of loan de-
mand  in  the U.S.A.  itself, were looking for op-
portunities to lend. The pressure from borrow-
ers  for a reduction  in  margins  which  ensued 
was  resisted firmly by the banks. A $ 500  mil-
lion credit obtained by Electricite de France in 
June 1976 admittedly carried a margin of 1 per 
cent for the first two years of its term and one 
of 1.125  per cent for the  remaining  five  years 
while  in  October the Venezuelan  Government 
secured  a  margin  of  1.125  per  cent  on  a  $ 
1 000 million seven year loan. These,  however, 
were exceptions and it was not until early 1977 
that  the  banks  reluctantly  lowered  their  mar-
gins in  lending to a few special borrowers. 
The  term to final maturity of most international 
medium-term credits remained  during  1976  in 
the five to seven year bracket. Seven years was 
rarely exceeded. 
Table  14  - Publicized medium and long-term International bank loans C) 
(million units of account) 
1975  1976 
Currencies: 
u.s.$  15 921.6  22602.9 
Other  567.1  1 750.9 
Total  16 488.7  24 353.8 
Borrowers: 
OECD countries  4 986.4  9 020.2 
of which: EEC countries  1 239.4  3 876.9 
comprising: public authorities  467.0  1 238.8 
enterprises  772.4  2 638.1 
Non-OECD countries  11 502.3  15 333.6 
of which: developed countries  2 494.5  2 895.2 
developing countries  9 007.8  12 438.4 
(')  This table is based on OECD data and covers international markets throughout the world in addition to the 
European international market. 
See "Principal Sources" 11. 48 
CONCLUSION 
The year 1976 probably represents a transition-
al  stage as far as investment in the Community 
and its financing are concerned. Just as in pro-
moting economic recovery,  progress in  re-es-
tablishing a normal rhythm of investment, was 
uneven. In some countries investment was still 
falling  in  volume  and  in  others  efforts  to 
achieve a large increase in  real  terms resulted 
in overstrain. Business investment was particu-
larly hard to reactivate on a satisfactory scale. 
The volume of personal saving seemed to have 
fallen back from an  exceptionally high level but 
appeared  still  to be  adequate.  A  modest rec-
overy in retained earnings of businesses made 
a welcome  appearance  in  a number of coun-
tries. 
In view of the modest increase in fixed invest-
ment  in  1976  the  flow  of financial  resources 
seems  to have  been  adequate.  In  some  mar-
kets borrowing may have been discouraged by 
the  high  cost  which,  however,  resulted  not 
from an excessive demand for finance but from 
action taken to defend the external value of the 
currencies in question. Potential borrowers on 
such  markets  would  in  most  instances  have 
been  discouraged  from  approaching  other, 
cheaper,  markets  - where they were  free  to 
do  so  by  the  generally  higher  degree  of  ex-
change risk in  such operations. To  this extent 
therefore  exchange  rate  movements  in  1976 
exercised a disruptive influence on investment. 
But the main reasons for a somewhat sluggish 
performance  in  the  field  of  business  invest-
ment seem to have been the existence of sur-
plus  capacity,  the  need  for a further strengt-
hening  of  internal  financial  structures  and  a 
lack of confidence in  the face  of an  uncertain 
economic  outlook.  Companies  still  face  bal-
ance  sheet  problems  in  providing  adequately 
for the replacement of fixed investment, the re-
placement cost of which  has  continued to be 
affected by high rates of inflation. The  slowing 
of  the  increase  in  prices  in  most  Member 
Countries during  1976 would  have  been  more 
welcome  if it  had  been  general  and  had  not 
been reversed here and there towards the end 
of the year. The revival of demand as economic 
activity grows coupled with the return of more 
stable  financial  conditions  should  help  to en-
courage a more general willingness to invest. PRINCIPAL SOURCES USED IN THIS REPORT 
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